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I. INTRODUCTION
Although Nigeria has enjoyed civilian rule since May 29, 1999,1
"democracy ' 2 or civil rule has not resulted in improved human rights for
the country. A paradox exists between civil rule and human rights
violations in the country that this Article focuses on.3 The task of the
piece is to explain why the expectation of improved human rights under a
democratic regime has failed to materialize under General Obasanjo. 4 A
debate rages concerning the impact of democratization on human rights in
Africa that the Article contributes to.5 The study draws on the experience
1. This date marked the inauguration of Nigeria's latest democracy (and
republic). Nigerians celebrate each of their exposures to democracy since independence
with the appellation "republic". The present Obasanjo regime sets off the Fourth
Republic. The First existed from 1960 to 1966 and the Second from 1979 to 1983. An
anticipated Third Republic became still-born when General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-
93) annulled a presidential election that would have ushered in that republic. Each of the
previous Republics preceding this latest one ended on a note of military intervention.
2. For reasons presented infra in Part V.A., we refer to the present government in
Nigeria as "civil rule", rather than as a "democracy" in any sense other than figure of speech.
3. A paradox is a statement that contradicts expectation of received wisdom. See
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 989 (3d ed. 1993). The expected
wisdom under contradiction here is that the experience of civil rule will result in
improved human rights for the citizenry, which it has not.
4. Reference in this Article to the government under General Obasanjo should not
be taken to mean that the President represents the only symbol of Nigeria's civilian
government. For although the President occupies a dominant position in the country's
presidential system of government, he is only one out of numerous symbols or centers of
the constitutional system that includes a bicameral national assembly of 469 members
(109 senators and 360 representatives), a national judiciary, a national civil service,
thirty-six state governments plus a federal capital territory, and hundreds of local
governments. See, e.g., Richard Joseph et al., Nigeria, in INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE POLITICs 546, 575-85 (Mark Kesselman et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2000) (listing
the organization of the country's complex political system).
5. See, e.g., Joseph Takougang, 'Human Rights and Multiparty Democracy in
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Historical Perspective, 1 21ST CENTURY AFRO REV. 145, 145-77
(1995). See generally Akwasi Aidoo, Africa: Democracy Without Human Rights, 15
HUM. RTS. Q. 703 (1993).
[VOL. 4: 209, 2003] Nigeria Since May 1999
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
of Nigeria since May 1999 to highlight the nature of the impact of
governmental systems on human rights.6 Much euphoria marked the
return to civil rule in the west African country in May 1999 of a kind that
has not been seen since the end of the civil war (1967-70).7 The event
signified an opportunity, after over fifteen years of repressive military
rule, for the country to resume its experiment with democracy from where
that journey stopped before soldiers seized power on New Year's Eve
1984.8 Nigerians share a zeal for freedom and democracy that military
rule dampens but never kills.9 Additionally, because army rule between
1983 and 1999 was characterized by massive human rights violations, |0
the return to civil rule left renewed hope for improved human rights.
The Article seeks to understand why much of the hope for improved
human rights has remained unrealized. It has four parts, in addition to this
introduction and a conclusion. Part II. provides a definition of human
rights, the history of these rights in Nigeria, and the machinery that has
evolved over the years, all the way up to the Obasanjo presidency, for the
enforcement of these rights. Part Ill. describes the practice of human
rights in Nigeria before 1999. The section integrates General Obasanjo's
6. See discussion infra Part V.A.
7. For example, Abdulsalami Abubakar, the general transferring power, compared
the return to civil rule to the country's receipt of independence from Britain in 1960,
whereas Olusegun Obasanjo, the retired general receiving power, viewed it as "the
beginning of a genuine renaissance in Nigeria." See Norimitsu Onishi, Nigeria Military
Turns Over Power to Elected Leader, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1999, at 1, 6.
8. General Obasanjo intoned in his maiden address that "Today, we are taking a
decisive step in the path of democracy. We will leave no stone unturned to ensure
sustenance of democracy, because it is good for us, it is good for Africa, and it is good
for the world." Id. at 1.
9. See Ali M. Ali et al., Senate Backs House, Reopens Constitutional Breaches,
THISDAY (LAGOS), Aug. 28, 2002, available at http://www.thisdayonline.coml
archive/2002/08/28/20020828.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) (containing the statement
of one senator that Nigerians look "forward to democracy and democratization since
independence as a precondition for the growth and development of the nation and its
people..."); Larry Diamond, Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism, and the Struggle for
Democracy, in 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AFRICA 33 (Larry Diamond et
al. eds., 1988) (describing Nigerians as a people who have "never been content with
authoritarian rule" and a people who, through the "vicissitudes of political crisis and
economic disarray," have "maintained a profound commitment to personal freedom and
political participation"). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA: A
BRIEFING FOR THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT CLINTON, Briefing Paper (Aug. 22, 2000),
available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/nigeria/print-version.htm (last visited Jan.
14, 2003) (reporting the result of a survey on popular attitudes to democracy carried out
in 2000, which found strong popular sentiments in favor of democratic governance
among eighty percent of the Nigerian population).
10. See discussion infra Part III.
role and it points to the legacy of British colonialism in Nigeria as a major
factor responsible for the country's poor human rights record. Part IV. is
an assessment, using various objective benchmarks, of General Obasanjo's
human rights record since May 1999. Part V. provides four explanations
for the paradox symbolized in the coexistence of civil rule and unabated
human rights violations in Nigeria since 1999.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT
Human rights are freedoms such as life, liberty, security, subsistence,
and other guarantees to which people as humans have rights." I They are
generally understood as claims or entitlements against the state or
society held equally by all persons simply because they are human
beings.' 2 Governments have a "first responsibility" for promoting and
protecting these rights. 3 They are obligated not only to respect but also
to create all conditions necessary for the practical and effective
enjoyment of every human right guaranteed for their citizenry.' 4  No
genuine development takes place at the expense of human rights.' 
5
Three distinct categories of human rights identified in the literature are
political-civil rights; social, economic, and cultural (or socioeconomic)
rights; and, solidarity rights. 6 The first two categories of rights are fully
11. See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS I (2d ed. 1998).
12. See id. (human rights "are usually taken to have a special reference to the ways in
which states treat their own citizens"). Conceptually speaking, human rights is simply the
"form in which the international community, under Western influence, has chosen to express
human dignity .... " Although a concept with a Western origin, human rights is also so
evolutionary and dynamic that today it is recognized and accepted throughout the world as a
universal term. Virginia A. Leary, The Effect of Western Perspectives on International
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 15, 29-30
(Abdullahi A. An-Na'm & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN
AFRICA]. Note that human rights as understood and practiced today under the U.N. system is
distinguished from the idea of human rights (or freedom), which is something common to
every civilization. See Philip C. Aka, The Military, Globalization, and Human Rights in
Africa, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 361, 375-76 (2002).
13. LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 4 (1999)
(quoting the text of the Declaration and Program of Action adopted by participants at the
conclusion of the Second World Conference of Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993).
14. See Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 53/144, U.N. GAOR 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc
A/RES/53/144 (1999).
15. U. Oil UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS
23 (1997). See also Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies,
in CONSOLIDATING THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACIES: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 15
(Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1997) (insisting that, irrespective of how freely
elected they were or the substantiality of their majority, regimes should not be viewed as
democracies if they fail to respect the rights of individuals and minorities, among other
constitutional subversions).
16. See, e.g., Aka, supra note 12, at 371-74.
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elaborated in the international bill of rights 7 that also, to a lesser extent,
elaborates solidarity rights, such as the right to self-determination.' 8 All
three categories of human rights are also elaborated in the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR).19 The ACHPR is considered
unique among international human rights instruments for its emphasis on
duty and solidarity rights.20 The instrument among the international bill of
rights elaborating on political-civil rights is the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).21 The instrument among the international
bill of rights elaborating socioeconomic rights is the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).22 These two human
rights instruments had been envisioned in 1948 as a single treaty, denoted as
the International Human Rights Covenants, but was broken into two because
of the Cold War.23
Political-civil rights include the right to life, dignity of human persons,
personal liberty, fair hearing, private and family life, and right to
freedom from discrimination.24 Others are the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression and the press,
25peaceful assembly and association; and, freedom of movement.
Socioeconomic rights include the right to education; right to work,
including protection against unemployment; right to form and join trade
unions; and, right to social security, among other rights.26 Solidarity
17. Three instruments comprising the international bill of rights are the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).
18. See A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 34-35
(4th ed. 1996) (referring particularly to the UDHR).
19. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), done June 27, 1981,
21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
20. See ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 18, at 249, 254-60.
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted Dec.
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976).
22. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
registered Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Jan. 3, 1976).
23. DONNELLY, supra note I1, at 8. See RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 2 (1986); Leary, supra note 12, at 25-26. The cold war is the
political-economic and ideological rivalry from 1945 to about 1990 between the United
States and the former Soviet Union for control of countries in the developing world. See
generally RONALD E. POWALSKI, THE COLD WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET
UNION 1917-1991 (1998).
24. See, e.g., NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 30-34 (1979).
25. Id.
26. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), arts. 22-
27, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
rights include, in addition to the right to self-determination previously
referred to,27 the rights to peace, development, a clean/healthy environment,
and of people to freely exploit/dispose of their natural resources.2 8 The
U.N. General Assembly, in 1986, recognized the right to development.29
These rights are denominated "solidarit," because they require "the
solidarity of peoples" to carry into effect. 7
Political-civil, socioeconomic, and solidarity rights are referred to
sometimes, respectively, as "first-generation", "second-generation", and
"third-generation" rights. The denominations are based simply on when
the rights in question were generated and do not suggest that any of
these rights takes precedence over the other. The various generations of
human rights "highlight the evolution and mutual interdependence of
these rights rather than suggest that any category should have priority
over the others.",31 First-generation rights are primarily the legacy of the
Age of Enlightenment and the American Bill of Rights; second-
generation rights are the legacy of the Age of Industrialization and the
Soviet Constitution of 1917; and, third-generation rights are a reflection
of the failure of domestic sovereignty in the latter part of the twentieth
century to solve global problems.32 Each of the various generations of
rights complements and completes the others.33
Political-civil rights are guaranteed but not always respected by
constitutions of many African countries. The situation is worse for
socioeconomic rights that, in many countries, are not even considered
real rights worthy of protection as constitutional guarantees. But the
situation appears to be changing for the better. Recently, the ACHPR issued a
landmark decision in a suit filed against the Nigerian government that
27. See supra text accompanying note 18.
28. CHRIS MAINA PETER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 59-74 (1990); KAREN A.
MINGST & MARGARET P. KARNS, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA 165
(2d ed. 2000).
29. MINGST & KARNS, supra note 28, at 165.
30. UMOZURIKE, supra note 15, at 51. Karel Vasak, who first elaborated this latest
generation of rights describes these rights as values that "can be realized only through
the concerted efforts of all the actors on the social scene":
These rights seek to infuse human dimension into areas where it has all too
often been missing, having been left to the state or states .... [T]hey are new
in that they may be both invoked against the state and demanded of it; but
above all ... they can be realized only through the concerted efforts of all the
actors on the scene: the individual, state, public and private bodies and the
international community.
Id. (quoting Karel Vasak, For the Third Generation of Human Rights: The Rights of
Solidarity, Inaugural Lecture, 10th Study Session of the International Institute of Human
Rights (July 1979)).
31. Aka, supra note 12, at 375.
32. Id. at 372-73.
33. For more on the nature of the complementary and reinforcing relationship
among these rights see Table I infra in Part IV.B.
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signals both a strong statement on the validity/enforceability of
socioeconomic rights and movement toward protection of solidarity rights.34
Although reference to human rights often connotes individual
rights, the concept is not limited to individual rights, 35 but rather
includes collective or group rights.36 Human rights can be either
individual or group. 37 Political-civil rights and socioeconomic rights
are individual rights that may also be enjoyed by groups; 38 and,
solidarity rights like the rights to peace, development, a clean
environment, and the right to self-determination are group rights that
individuals may also enjoy.39  Both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) and the ACHPR recognize both individual
and group rights.
Guarantee of human rights in Nigeria, "has its genesis in the attempt
to allay the fears of minority ethnic groups .... 40 These minority
groups feared that majority groups in their regions would dominate
and/or relegate them to the margins of national economic and political
34. See Jim Lobe, African Commission Hands Down Far-Reaching Human Rights
Decision, Oneworld, July 3, 2002 (on file with author). Felix Morka, director of the
Lagos-based Social and Economic Rights Action Center, a human rights non-
governmental organization, which argued this case, praised the decision as the first by
the African Commission "to specifically and comprehensively address violations of
economic and social and cultural rights under the African Charter." Id. For one
assessment of the composition, functions, and other features of the African Commission
see Laurie S. Wiseberg, The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 22 A
JOURNAL OF OPINION, 34-41 (1994) (now AFRICAN ISSUES).
35. Rhoda E. Howard, Group versus Individual Identity in the African Debate on
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 12, at 181-82 (human rights "do
not necessarily imply possessive individualism ..... Id.).
36. Id. at 182. ("The purpose of human rights is. .'. to protect people-individually
or in groups-against the state." Id.). See also Leary" supra note 12, at 30 (stating that
human rights is a "dynamic and evolutionary" concept "that has recently been extended
to cover many aspects of human dignity," including group rights, "not contemplated
under the traditional Western rubric of human rights"). Professor Howard achieves a
marriage between individual and group rights using the concept of "ethnic
individualism," by which she means "a concern with the rights of individuals, either on
their own or as members of families, kinship groups, and religious or other groups that
they value .. " Howard, supra note 35, at 182.
37. For more on the nature of the complementary and reinforcing relationship
between individual and group rights see discussion infra Part V.D.
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (referring particularly to
socioeconomic rights).
39. Howard, supra note 35, at 182 (stating that the purpose of human rights is to
protect people, whether individually or in groups, against the state).
40. Ekwueme Okoli, Toward a Human Rights Framework in Nigeria, in TOWARD
A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 203, 204 (Peter Schwab & Adamantia Pollis eds., 1982).
life once Nigeria became independent from Britain. As a result, the
British government, in 1956, appointed a commission headed by Sir
Henry Willink (the Willink or minorities' commission) to inquire into
the justification for these fears and recommend means for allaying
them. 4 1 The end result was the insertion of fundamental guarantees in
the country's independence and post-independence constitutions.
However, Nigerian constitutions do not guarantee all three categories
of human rights. Political-civil rights are guaranteed as "fundamental
rights. 42 These constitutions also embody socioeconomic guarantees,4 3
but do not protect them as real or "fundamental rights." 44 Rather, the
"guarantees" are viewed as mere aspirations and denoted non-justiciable,
meaning that, unlike for political-civil rights, citizens may not sue and
get remedies in a court of law if and when the government violates these
rights. 45 Human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the
country find the occurrence unsatisfactory. Thus, for example, the
Committee for the Defense of Human Rights laments that the 1999
Constitution's socioeconomic profile reduces it to little more than "a
treatise on abdication of responsibilities. 46  Finally, although rights
guaranteed in Nigerian constitutions exist for both individuals and
groups,47 these constitutions do not provide for solidarity rights like the
41. Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Fears of the Minorities
and the Means of Allaying Them (1958) [hereinafter Willink Commission Report].
42. See, e.g., NIG. CONST., supra note 24, §§ 30-34 (1979) (whose provisions
include the right to life, dignity of human persons, personal liberty, fair hearing, private
and family life, right to freedom from discrimination, right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, freedom of expression and the press, peaceful assembly and
association, and freedom of movement).
43. See id. ch. II (dealing with "Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles
of State Policy").
44. Id.
45. For elaboration of the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state
policy generally and description of the nature of the distinction between political-civil
and socioeconomic rights in particular see FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, I REPORT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING COMMITTEE v-vii (1977).
46. COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN NIGERIA 1999 100 (July 2000) [hereinafter COMMITTEE
ANNUAL REPORT].
47. One writer posits that this writing of guarantees into the Constitution
highlights a decision in favor of group rights in Nigerian human rights debate. OKOLI,
supra note 40, at 204. Actually, the decision marks a simultaneous preference for both
group and individual rights and illustrates the close inter-connection and
complementarity of these rights. The guarantees contained in the 1960 and subsequent
constitutions were rights denominated for people qua individuals. The guarantees were
also, at the same time, "minority" rights, meant to assuage the fear or concern of
minorities concerning possible domination by majority groups after the Willink
commission failed to recommend for them the new states these minorities argued they
needed to insulate them from majority domination. See also supra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text. Today, these guarantees may be claimed by any group regardless of
whether it is majority or minority.
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right to peace or a clean environment or free exploitation of natural
resources on a group's own land.48
The machinery traditionally used to enforce human rights in Nigeria, like
in many other societies, is the judiciary or courts. During eras of civilian
rule, these courts do a fairly good job protecting human rights,49 but are
much less effective in periods of military rule when judicial autonomy
becomes severely vitiated. 50 The judiciary remained the only machinery for
human rights enforcement in Nigeria until 1995. That was the year the
human rights commission approach evolved as a supplement to the
traditional machinery. The establishment of the National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC) had all the mark of the strange irony that sometimes
characterizes the conduct of public affairs in Nigeria. The NHRC was set
up by a military decree and during the rule of the ruthless dictator General
48. The closest to these rights in Nigeria would be the "Federal Character"
Doctrine. One of the important innovations of the country's Second Republic
constitutionalism, this Doctrine, in pertinent part, provides that:
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies
and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect
the federal character and the need to promote national unity, and also to
command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no
predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other
sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies.
NIG. CONST., supra note 24, § 14(3) (1979). Put differently, to give every ethnic group
within the country a sense of belonging and promote national loyalty, the Doctrine
requires that the distribution of appointments, contracts, educational opportunities, or
other federal benefits-what Nigerians colloquially dub "federal presence"-reflect the
country's federal character, and not benefit any one group at the expense of others.
However, it did not take long for the Doctrine to become distorted. See generally
FEDERAL CHARACTER AND FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA (Peter P. Ekeh & Eghosa E. Osaghae
eds., 1989). And no Nigerian leader has applied it consistently. Ironically, as this
Article shows, this includes General Obasanjo, under whose first government the
Doctrine was written into the Constitution. Prior to Obasanjo, General Abacha (1993-
98) held the record for neglect of the Doctrine. Under him, all the military service
chiefs, the Secretary to the Federal Government, the Inspector-General of Police, and
seventeen out of the nineteen Assistant Inspectors-General of Police were all
Northerners. See Philip C. Aka, Nigeria: The Need for an Effective Policy of Ethnic
Reconciliation in the New Century, 14 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP L.J. 327, 354 n. 190 (2000).
49. See generally B. Obinna Okere, Judicial Activism or Passivity in Interpreting
the Nigerian Constitution, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 788 (1987).
50. See Charles Mwalimi, The Influence of Constitutions on the Development of a
Nation's Law and Legal System: The Case of Zambia and Nigeria, 8 ST. Louis UNIV. PUB.
L. REv. 181, 184 (1989). For general assessment of the judiciary not limited to any one
era, civilian or military see, e.g., Jennifer Widner, Building Judicial Independence in
Common Law Africa, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
NEW DEMOCRACIES 177-94 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999); B.O. NWABUEZE,
JUDICIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN GOVERNMENT (1977).
Sani Abacha (1993-98)."' In setting up the commission, Abacha meant to
fulfill Nigeria's commitment to the United Nations and the Organization for
African Unity (OAU) to establish a national institution for human rights
protection !52 Some observers point to the influence of external factors in
explaining the foundation of the NHRC.53 Others cite the foundation as a
testament to the commitment of Nigerian people for justice even in the face
of great odds.54 At any rate, the NHRC was empowered to deal with all matters
relating to human rights protection under the Nigerian Constitution, the
ACHPR, and the UDHR; it was specifically charged with the responsibility of
monitoring and investigating alleged cases of human rights violations and
making recommendations to the central government.55 The NHRC has sixteen
members and has, since its inception, been headed by a retired judge.56
Soon after he assumed office, President Obasanjo established a
commission, the Human Right Violations Investigation Commission
(HRVIC or the Oputa Panel),57 to investigate past human rights abuses in
the country. The panel's mandate was to ascertain the nature and causes of
these abuses, with particular reference to mysterious deaths and
assassinations or attempted assassinations; identify persons or organizations
who perpetrated those abuses; determine whether the violations were a
product of state policy; and, recommend measures designed to redress these
past injustices and prevent/forestall future violations. 58  The work of the
panel initially covered the period 1994-99 but was later extended backward
51. Righting the Wrongs of the Past, Special International Report on Nigeria,






57. "Oputa" refers to Chukwudifu I. Oputa, a retired Supreme Court justice who
chaired the seven-person commission. The six other members are Alhaji Ali Kura
Michika, Rev. Matthew Kuka, Margaret Pam, Mallam Mamman Daura (later replaced by
Alhaji Adamu Lawal Bamalli), Tunji Abayomi, Modupe Areda, and T.D. Oyelade
(secretary). General Obasanjo was the only former Nigerian military ruler to appear before
the commission. Three living former military rulers whose regimes preceded Obasanjo's,
namely, Generals Muhammadu Buhari (1983-85), Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93), and
Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-99), were subpoenaed to appear before the commission but
none appeared. See Shola Oshunkeye, No Hiding Place for the Generals, TELL (LAGOS),
Aug. 27, 2001, at 31-35 (including a description of the abuses for which the generals were
subpoenaed); Mustapha Ogunsakin, Oputa Panel Ends Sitting, Warns of Imminent Crisis,
GUARDIAN ONLINE (Lagos), Oct. 19, 2001 (on file with author).
58. Although the Oputa Panel's charge mentions redress, more than anything else,
the purpose of the commission was actually reconciliation. In setting up the panel, General
Obasanjo spoke about "restor[ing] harmony in our country," and about moving the country
forward from "an unprecedented wickedness and oppressive era in our history." Righting
the Wrongs, supra note 51. Also, in elaborating his understanding of his panel's charge,
Justice Oputa stated that "[an eye for an eye will only leave the country blind." Id.
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
to the period of the first military coup in 1966. 59 There are two possible
reasons why General Obasanjo chose to establish a fresh, independent
commission, rather than assign the task to the already existent NHRC. The first
is that he wanted to distance his government from any association that smacks
of the military past. The second is the need to increase the level of confidence
of Nigerians in the exercise, given the NHRC's ambiguous history.60 He also
probably surmised that only a fresh, independent commission can draw out
the strain of reconciliation so central to the work of the Oputa Panel.
III. PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA BEFORE 1999
A. Problem of Human Rights in Nigeria
Since its formation in 1914, Nigeria has unveiled numerous
constitutions 61 that embody human rights guarantees. Constitutional
59. Although the duration covered by the panel is broad, the focus on "mysterious
deaths and assassinations or attempted assassinations" made the panel's mandate rather
limiting. Human rights violations in Nigeria for the period in question encompass large-
scale deprivations of life, liberty, and property. However, the mandate covers only life and
leaves out liberty and property. Also, even the spectrum of life covered is narrow, limited
as it is to mysterious deaths and assassinations or attempted assassinations. Life here, for
example, does not include the pogrom in 1966 and 1967 of 100,000 Easterners, mostly
Igbos, not to talk of the millions who died during the civil war from 1967 to 1970 either
through starvation "as a legitimate tool of war" instituted by the federal government or
killings that occurred from the federal government's incessant and wanton targeting of
unarmed civilians. Because the period covered by the inquiry included 1966 to 1975 when
General Gowon was in office, the General should have been subpoenaed to provide an
accounting of the acts of atrocities that happened during his watch. Unfortunately, only the
three generals whose rules immediately preceded General Obasanjo's presidency were
invited. The non-invitation of General Gowon signifies that the government included,
obviously for political gains, but did not really mean to cover the atrocities the federal
government perpetrated against Igbos and other Easterners from 1967 to 1970. An Igbo
group made a reparations claim of $86 billion for losses inflicted on the ethnic group,
which the government simply ignored. Worse still, the President has broken promises that
raise question regarding the depth of even the gesture of reconciliation the panel represents.
For example, following repeated appeals since he took office, General Obasanjo agreed to
pay the retirement benefits of Igbo ex-servicemen who fought on the "rebel" (Biafran or
non-federal) side during the war. But when the retirees submitted their claims, a junior
minister in the defense department called them "traitors" and advised that they seek their
livelihood in "buying and selling" rather than expect any benefits from the government.
The President neither reprimanded this official nor in any way dissociated his government
from this position. To the contrary, he subsequently promoted this official to full minister.
See, e.g., John-Abba Ogbodo, Effiong Leads Biafran Ex-Soldiers to Reps, Seeks Pensions,
GuARDIAN ONLINE (Lagos), Feb. 27, 2002 (on file with author).
60. Righting the Wrongs, supra note 51.
61. See, e.g., Ebere Nwaubani, Constitution-Making and the Nigerian Identity, 1914-
1960, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF NIGERIA: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF TOYIN FALOLA, 73-112
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provisions for human rights in Nigeria are inadequate given that, as we
indicated in the previous section, the country provides for only political-
civil rights and leaves socioeconomic rights and solidarity rights
virtually unprotected. But although worrisome, this is not the main
source of trouble. That real pain lies with respect for rights. Rights
guaranteed in the country's numerous constitutions are often observed in
the breach without regard to which government is in power. Rights
become abused either because the military comes seizing its way into
power and discards the constitution, or because a civilian (democratic)
government assumes office and disrespects these rights.
In short, huge discrepancies exist between constitutional provisions of
human rights in Nigeria and actual implementation of these rights.62 The
country was founded on a note of egregious human rights violation.
Because it negates the right of people to determine for themselves rather
than have foreigners do so for them, colonial control is inconsistent with
any notion of human rights.63 Indeed, British rule in Nigeria, as in other
colonies, involved acts replete with negative ramifications for the life,
liberty, and property of Nigerians. 64 But by far the most serious of the
human rights atrocities Britain perpetrated on Nigerians was the fact that
it lumped together, by fiat, without any consultation whatsoever, a
multiplicity of diverse peoples who until 1914 had never lived together
under one governmental roof or even closely interacted with one
another. 65  This lumping together, commemorated in history as "The
Amalgamation", is a root factor responsible for the country's poor
human rights record since independence.66
(Adebayo Oyebade ed., 2002); Chris N. Okeke, The Debt Burden: An African Perspective, 35
INT'L LAW. 1489, 1493, n.27 (2002) (counting eleven constitutions from 1914 to 2001).
62. See, e.g., Chris W. Ogbondah, Press Freedom in West Africa: An Analysis of
One Ramification of Human Rights, 22 A JOURNAL OF OPINION 21-26 (1994) (now
AFRICAN ISSUES).
63. See Aka, supra note 12, at 371-81.
64. Id. at 381. (British rule was marked by abuse of Nigerian individual and
collective rights in all categories and "left in its wake negative legacies in politics,
economics, and social lives with ruinous consequences for human rights .. " Id.).
65. See, e.g., Philip C. Aka, The "Dividend of Democracy": Analyzing U.S.
Support for Nigerian Democratization, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 229 (2002).
Nigeria houses three of the largest and most competitive ethnic groups ever in Africa.
These ethnic groups which collectively make up two-thirds of the country are Hausa-
Fulanis, lgbos, and Yorubas. Seven percent of the world's languages are spoken in the
country, the highest number of languages in any single nation. Id. at 228-29.
66. See, e.g., Robert Guest, Survey: Nigeria, Fissiparous Folk, ECONOMIST, Jan.
15, 2000, at 14 (indicating that "one of Nigeria's most enduring problems" is "holding
together a country with such a diverse and fractious population" and that "[aintagonism
between north and south is not simply about religion; it is a tribal matter, too, with deep
historical roots"). Nigerians perpetually rue "the mistake of 1914" and, several years
before the civil war, talks about confederation and secession were fashionable in the
country. See I A.H.M. KIRK-GREENE, CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: A
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
Probably because of this erroneous human rights foundation, in the
years since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has moved from one episode
of human rights violations to another. "Most adult Nigerians have directly
and poignantly experienced" human rights abuses,67 arising from military
rule, civil war, violent changes of government, and nonstop governmental
corruption, 68 to name just these occurrences. 69 The country started and
completed a civil war within the very first decade of its existence as an
independent nation !70 Dubiously reputed as "the bloodiest civil war of the
20th century,' the conflict claimed the lives of 3 million Igbos,72 a
substantial proportion of the entire Igbo population. 73 Military rulership,
DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK 1966-1969 3 (1971); EGHOSA E. OSAGHAE, CRIPPLED
GIANT: NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 1, 46 (1998). The President himself, in a recent
ex-ray of the state of the union, allowed that "the major mistake of independence was
that we had three countries [Hausa-Fulanis, Igbos, and Yorubas] in one ...." Obasanjo
Declares No Agreement With Northern Elders, GUARDIAN ONLINE (LAGOS), Sept. 29,
2002 (on file with author).
To illustrate this difficulty in living together under one national roof, as early as 1945,
northern Muslims orchestrated deadly "riots" that led to the deaths of hundreds of
innocent Igbos in Jos and destruction of valuable Igbo properties. This started a pattern
that would recur repeatedly in the life of the country. A repeat of this deadly act in May
1953, this time in Kano, impelled the British colonial authorities to set up a commission
of inquiry into these "disturbances", the idea being to avert further reoccurrences. From
every indication, as future acts of violence against Igbos prove, this simply did not work.
67. WILLIAM D. GRAF, THE NIGERIAN STATE 13 (1988).
68. Robert Guest, Survey: Nigeria, Under New Management, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15,
2000, at 3.
69. See OLADIMEJI ABORISADE & ROBERT J. MUNDT, POLITICS IN NIGERIA 159-61
(2d ed. 2002) (listing episodes of political violence with ramifications for human rights
from 1953 to 2000).
70. A sampling of the numerous works on the Nigerian civil war, otherwise known
as the Biafra war include JOHN DE ST. JORRE, THE BROTHERS' WAR: BIAFRA AND
NIGERIA (1972); CDENEK CERVENKA, THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR 1967-1970 (1971);
KIRK-GREENE, supra note 66; 2 A.H.M. KIRK-GREENE, CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN
NIGERIA: A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK JULY 1967-JANUARY 1970 (1971); FREDERICK
FORSYTH, THE BIAFRAN STORY (1970).
71. KIRK-GREENE, supra note 66, at vii.
72. See Alexander A. Madiebo, Obasanjo, The Civil War, and Resource Control,
VANGUARD ONLINE (LAGOS), June 29, 2001, available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/
news/articles/2001/June/29062001/p14290601.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003). Major
General Madiebo commanded the Biafran Army. For his memoir on the war see
ALEXANDER A. MADIEBO, THE NIGERIAN REVOLUTION AND THE BIAFRA WAR (1980).
73. The Nigerian federal government declared all-out war against the Igbos and
other ethnic groups in the former eastern region for engaging in "secession" by declaring
themselves an independent Republic of Biafra. But the secession followed an
unprovoked genocide by northern Muslims the federal government could have stopped
but failed to stop which claimed the lives of about 100,000 Easterners, mostly Igbos, and
caused millions living in the North to flee to the South, abandoning their possessions and
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in existence during the war, continued until 1999 when General Obasanjo
took office.74 The only respite, additional to the period 1960 to 1966, was
during the Second Republic from 1979 to 1983. Even so, democracy, to
the extent it was experienced during these two fleeting periods, was
replete with anti-democratic features, which rendered it low quality.75 A
rrsum6 of "the overriding story of Nigeria" since independence has been
"[t]he progressive erosion of democratic and developmental promise. 76
One common feature that the colonial and post-colonial periods share is
the violation of the human rights of inhabitants.
B. Human Rights in Nigeria from Buhari to Abacha
Oppressive military rule from 1983 to 1999 by a desperate generation of
military dictators wreaked havoc on all categories of human rights,
without exception. From Muhammadu Buhari (1983-85) to Ibrahim
Babangida (1985-93) to Sani Abacha (1993-98), Nigerian military rulers
violated the political-civil rights of their citizens. Buhari believed every
Nigerian could use a little discipline and he frog-jumped government
employees who came late to work. 77 Babangida unveiled a fake transition
to democracy program and annulled a free election because he did not like
the winner.78 Under him, the government used its secret police to silence
creating a refugee nightmare that ran into several million people. See OSAGHAE, supra
note 66, at 63, 69. Igbos and other Easterners declared Biafra simply to save themselves
from extermination given the inability of the federal government to protect their lives,
liberty, and property.
74. Including the period before the civil war, Nigeria came under military rule for
a total of almost twenty-nine out of thirty-nine years, counting from 1960. Nigerian
commentators depicted military rule as a passing aberration. But until 1999, when
General Obasanjo took office, military rule was the norm in the country and civil rule the
aberration. Actually, as William Graf points out, the real norm of Nigerian politics is the
seemingly endless alternation of "civilian and military regimes" or what he dubs
"pendulum-movement." GRAF, supra note 67, at 234.
75. See Larry Diamond, Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into
Praetorianism, in POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 423-27, 433-40, 464-71 (Larry
Diamond et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
76. Id. at 417. See also Robert J. Mundt & Oladimeji Aborisade, Politics in
Nigeria, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS TODAY 681, 682 (Gabriel A. Almond et al. eds., 7th
ed. 2000) (stating, quite correctly, that Nigerians feel unrelieved frustration "over the
failure of their potentially wealthy country to provide for basic human needs, for
education, for reliable transportation and communications and for a state structure free of
rampant corruption"); Richard Joseph, Nigeria and the Challenge of Leadership, TELL
(LAGOS), July 5, 1999, at 48 (maintaining that "[tihe Nigerian people have paid too great
a price for the confusion, deception and despotism inflicted on [them] by her leaders,
military as well as civilians, in the last few decades").
77. Robert Guest, Survey: Nigeria, The Last Despot?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2000, at 4.
78. One analyst aptly castigated the failed Babangida transition program as "one of
the most sustained exercises in political chicanery ever visited on a people." See
Diamond, supra note 75, at 443. For a critical analysis of this program see generally
TRANSITION WITHOUT END (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1997).
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disagreeable journalists such as Dele Giwa, who was killed through a
parcel bomb.79 Abacha held the all-time record for human rights disrespect
and atrocities. 8° Under him, dissidents were routinely tortured, political
prisoners were tried in camera before military tribunals that hardly set
them free, and execution of armed robbers and other wrongdoers were
commonplace. Abacha also hanged prominent Nigerians such as the
environmentalist and Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa; imprisoned others,
such as Obasanjo, Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, and Moshood Abiola; 82 and,
forced the rest, such as the Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, into exile.
Except for Buhari, all of these generals tried and summarily executed
hundreds of mostly young army officers whom they accused, truly or
falsely, of plotting coups against them. 83  Because military regimes
abrogate the Constitution when they come into office and rule by decrees
and fiats, political-civil rights are usually the first to go under any military
regime; 84 so, though still unjustified, there is really little surprise that these
rights came under assail during this period.
But political-civil rights were not the only rights violated during this
period; socioeconomic rights and solidarity rights also came under attack.
By 1999, Nigeria earned about $280 billion in oil revenues since the
production of oil in commercial quantity in the country.85 But most of this
income was squandered through corruption and mismanagement, and little
of it benefited the ordinary people.86 Worse still, the country accumulated a
79. See Diamond, supra note 75, at 450, 486 n.100.
80. Guest, supra note 77, at 4. ("Abacha's parting gift to the nation he pillaged
was to make Nigerians determined never to see his like again." Id.). See also
COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 108 (indicating that the general had a
"culture" of breaking up meetings, rallies, and other gatherings, even religious ones).
81. COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 108.
82. Yar'Adua was General Obasanjo's deputy during his days as military head of
state; Abiola was the presumed winner of the election Babangida annulled. General
Obasanjo was the only one among these imprisoned prominent Nigerians to come out of
prison alive; the others died in prison.
83. See Julius 0. lhonvbere, A Critical Evaluation of the Failed 1990 Coup in
Nigeria, 29 J. MOD. APR. STUD. 601-26 (1991) (analyzing the abortive April 1990 coup
against General Babangida). Buhari had hardly consolidated his rule before he was
removed in August 1985 in a palace coup carried out by General Babangida. Altogether
he was in office for only about twenty months.
84. See generally Ogbondah, supra note 62, at 21-26.
85. Robert Guest, Survey: Nigeria, A Tale of Two Giants, EcONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2000, at 5.
86. Id. For notions correctly portraying political corruption as unlawful assault on
individual and group human rights see Joseph, supra note 76, at 50 (stating that recent
"Pharaonic corruption" in the country constitutes "an abuse of fundamental human
rights, for it deprived many Nigerians of the means to sustain life itself"). See also
crushing external debt of about $30 billion.87 Although some leaders, like
Abacha, were more blatantly avaricious than others,88 all of Nigeria's
military rulers, without exception, engaged in graft. 89  As of 1998, the
country's per capita income was a paltry $345 a year, about one-third what
it was at the height of the oil boom in 1980.90 Despite huge receipts of
revenue from oil, by 1999, Nigerians were, on average, poorer than they
were in 1974.91 Unlike countries of comparable size and endowment, like
Indonesia that turned their oil incomes into comparatively productive
investment, Nigerians siphoned their oil income abroad or used it for
prestige projects.92 Few attempts made to correct this situation through
economic reforms failed because those attempts usually came too late and
did not go far enough.93 So, the parlous state of economic affairs left
citizens little socioeconomic rights for enjoyment.
Nor did solidarity rights fare any better. Rather, a serious deterioration
occurred in the quality of the relationship between the government and
many ethnic groups, as well as among ethnic groups themselves. One
episode in the Niger Delta that epitomized this worsening was the Ogoni
uprising against the national government.94 The Ogonis complained
bitterly and understandably about the negative environmental effects of oil
exploration and drilling on their lives and sought more share of oil
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and
Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under International
Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 149-63 (2000); NDIVA KOFELE-KALE, Preface to THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES: HOLDING HEADS
OF STATE AND OTHER HIGH RANKING STATE OFFICIALS INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR ACTS
OF FRAUDULENT ENRICHMENT xv (1995).
87. This unfortunate situation came about because, as Robert Guest explains,
successive Nigerian governments borrowed billions of dollars against future oil revenues
which they wasted too. Guest, supra note 85, at 5.
88. See id. at 6 for details.
89. Although the true total will probably never be known, it is estimated that
Nigerian military rulers misappropriated or embezzled tens of billions of dollars. Id.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing DAVID L. BEVAN ET AL., NIGERIA AND INDONESIA: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF POVERTY, EQUITY AND GROWTH (Oxford University Press 1999)). An
anecdotal bad joke regarding corruption in the two countries is that whereas in Indonesia
government functionaries settle for only ten percent commission, in Nigeria they go for
broke, settling for nothing less than the entire 100 percent. Id.
93. See Chukwuma F. Obidegwu, Nigeria: Priorities and Prospects for the 1990s,
in PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 126-61
(Aguibou Y. Yansane ed., 1996) (analyzing General Babangida's "home-made"
structural adjustment program).
94. See, e.g., Eghosa E. Osaghae, The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority
Agitation and the Future of the Nigerian State, 94 AFR. AFF. 325-44 (1991); Aka, supra
note 48, at 344-45. The Ogonis are a Nigerian ethnic group of about 500,000 people.
An overview of the group's history can be found in Osaghae, supra, at 327-38. See also
Stephen Wright, The Government of Nigeria, in INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
GOVERNMENT 542, 584 (Michael Curtis ed., 4th ed. 1997).
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revenues to compensate for these effects.95 The uprising culminated in
the kangaroo trial and hanging of Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni
96indigenes. In a recent unprecedented decision, the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights sided with the Ogoni people in their
struggle against the government and vindicated the Ogoni position. The
Commission ruled that the Nigerian military regime engaged in "massive
violations" of the socioeconomic rights of the Ogoni people. 97 It found
that the government failed to protect Ogoni property, lands, and health
from destruction caused by oil exploration by foreign oil companies and
"ruthless military operations" by Nigerian security forces.98 A key
element of the assault on individual and group human rights in the military
years, especially during the regime of General Abacha, was an elaborate
international public relations campaign "by which tyranny was defended
abroad, paid for with assets that should have been used to meet the needs
of Nigerians at home."99 Professor Richard Joseph advised that these
"nefarious machinations" should form an issue in any accounting of the
abuse of power during the military years, 00 but, unfortunately, the Oputa
Panel did not include this issue.
C. General Obasanjo's Contribution to Violations Before 1999
Significantly, General Obasanjo has been a participant in a number of the
episodes leading to human rights violations in Nigeria. He is a veteran of the
Biafran war, which, as we have seen, led to the violations of the human
rights of Igbos and other Easterners. General Obasanjo takes deep pride both
for his supposed valor in the war as well as for his role in reunifying the
95. For the exact nature of these effects see, e.g., William Boyd, Introduction to
KEN SARO-WIWA, A MONTH AND A DAY: A DETENTION DIARY i, x (1995) (commenting
on how "[w]hat was once a placid rural community of prosperous farmers and fishermen
is now an ecological waste land reeking of sulphur, its creeks and water holes poisoned
by indiscriminate oil spillage and ghoulishly lit at night by the orange flames of gas
flares"). A recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report equated the
oil spills in the Niger Delta to about a dozen Exxon-Valdez oil spills over a two or three-
year period! See Charles Cobb Jr. & Reed Kramer, Our Democracy Is Working-
Obasanjo, THISDAY (LAGOS), May 19, 2001, at 13.
96. For one account of the quality of the "Ogoni Nine" trial see WOLE SOYINKA, THE
OPEN SORE OF A CONTINENT: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF THE NIGERIAN CRISIS 145-53 (1996).
97. Lobe, supra note 34.
98. Id.
99. Joseph, supra note 76, at 50.
100. Id.
country.' ' His meteoric rise in the army all the way to military head of state
was a recognition and/or reward for his part in the war. In addition to his role
as an army commander, Obasanjo also held a political position as a Federal
Commissioner (or Minister) for Works, 10 2 and was therefore, an integral part
of the corrupt Gowon government. 0 3 He accepted the appointment in the




but was never able to bring himself to vigorously criticize the misdeeds of the
government. 10 5 Also, as military head of state from 1976 to 1979 Obasanjo
exercised power dictatorially with negative consequences for human rights.
These interludes of dictatorship include the quashing of a demonstration by
university students, leading to the death of six students in 1978; 106 the attack
on the home of Afro-beat musician Fela Anikulapo-Kuti during which the
talented musician was beaten, his mother thrown out the window, and their
home set ablaze;'0 7 and, the hanging of about thirty alleged coup plotters,
some of whom have been said to be innocent.108
Two occurrences, however, which seem to take the rough edge off
Obasanjo's political-civil rights record as a military ruler are his transfer of
power to civilians in 1979 and his campaign against military intervention
into politics and advocacy for democracy, as a private citizen, after he left
office. To illustrate the latter occurrence, General Obasanjo, in a 1991
review of African political and economic events, criticized the human rights
practices of many African leaders whom he asserted turn the hopes and
expectations of their people into a revolution of "fire and thunder".' 0 9 Little
101. See EZENWA OHAETO, CHINUA ACHEBE: A BIOGRAPHY 152 (1997) (recounting an
announcement by Obasanjo, then an army colonel, "praising himself for his accomplishment
in crushing Biafra and asking those in hiding to come out and surrender themselves"). See
also OLUSEGUN OBASANJO, MY COMMAND: AN ACCOUNT OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
(1981) (General Obasanjo's personal account of the Nigerian civil war).
102. ONUKABA A. OJO, OLUSEGUN OBASANJO: IN THE EYES OF TIME 170 (1997).
Obasanjo accepted the appointment, according to Ojo, "hoping to be able to make a
difference in the administration." Id.
103. See id. See also id. at 174 (indicating that by 1975, the Gowon regime had
become "synonymous with the most blatant form of venality in public life").
104. Ojo, supra note 102, at 170.
105. See id. at 175 (disclosing that "[w]orried by the vitriolic media attacks on
Gowon and his administration, [Obasanjo] pleaded with the press at formal and informal
meetings to tone down their attacks").
106. See OSAGHAE, supra note 66, at 94; Wadas Nas, Buhari, Obasanjo and Human
Rights, WEEKLY TRUST (ABUJA), June 7, 2002, available at http://gamji.tempdomainname.coml
wada58.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2003).
107. Aka, supra note 12, at 411.
108. Nas, supra note 106.
109. Olusegun Obasanjo, Africa in the 1990s: The Challenges of Economic
Reforms, in THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN AFRICA 5 (Olusegun
Obasanjo & Hans d'Orville ed., 1991). The abuses Obasanjo criticized include
persecution and repression of opposition parties and the press, intolerance of dissent, and
the concentration of power "to a degree that would have struck even Louis XIV as both
unwholesome and unnecessary." Id.
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wonder that one book on the Babangida failed transition to democracy
program co-edited by a team of respected Nigerian and western scholars
praised Obasanjo as "one of [Africa's] most passionate and eloquent voices
for democracy and permanent military withdrawal from politics," adding
that "[i]n both his writings and his deeds, General Obasanjo stands as an
example of the difference that leadership, vision, and integrity can make to
the future of Nigeria and the quest for democracy."' 
1 0
However, equally compelling evidences exist that negate his support for
democracy or portray that support as conflicted."' For example, in 1989,
the General published a book in which he called for a one-party system of
government and a unicameral legislature. 12 Analysts assessed the proposal
as a complete departure from the multi-party presidential system of the
country's Second Republic (retained in the present Fourth Republic)
Obasanjo helped establish in 1979."' Although he defended that his
advocacy was not for a classical one-party system, but for a system of
administration with sufficient checks and balances to prevent abuses,' 14 the
explanation was not persuasive. Furthermore, as a young military officer
during the 1970s, Obasanjo did not see anything wrong with soldiers
assuming a political role in government. During an interview with the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in London, Obasanjo maintained
that ".... it will probably not be right to cut out the military for a special
political office or political favor just because they happen to have the
monopoly of violence."'"15 Closely examined, then, tributes to Obasanjo's
democratic credentials, such as the one by Diamond, Kirk-Greene, and
Oyediran cited above, go mainly to his record as the general who returned
power to civilians. The action takes on special meaning when it is
considered that he was the first to do so in the history of the country and that
several fake transitions to civil rule programs took place in the twenty years
before 1999 when General Abubakar orchestrated another successful
handover that, incidentally, transferred power back to General Obasanjo.
110. Larry Diamond et al., Acknowledgments, in TRANSITION WITHOUT END, supra
note 78, at xi.
111. One biography of the President rightly portrayed him as "a study in
ambivalence and ambiguity." OJO, supra note 102, at 28.
112. See generally OLUSEGUN OBASANJO, CONSTITUTION FOR NATIONAL
INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1989).
113. See ALAN RAKE, AFRICAN LEADERS: GUIDING THE NEW MILLENIUM 182
(Scarecrow Press 2001).
114. Id.
115. Ojo, supra note 102, at 168.
The same conflicting evidence or tone of "ambiguity" found in
political-civil rights characterized Obasanjo's records in the other human
rights categories. In socioeconomic rights, as military head of state,
Obasanjo failed to distinguish himself as a particularly wise economic
manager. He continued some of the wasteful prestige projects started by the
Yakubu Gowon regime (1966-75), one of the most visible of which was
the hosting of the second World Black and African Festival of Arts and
Culture, an international cultural extravaganza. 16 When governmental
spending outstripped oil returns and the economy went into decline, the
General responded by a variety of means that included the introduction
of a program designed to boost agriculture and reduce food imports,"
I7
belt-tightening, austerity measures, 1 8 and external borrowing, 19 none of
which, unfortunately, succeeded in turning around the bad economic
tide. 20 The government's relationship with minority and majority ethnic
groups did not become damaged when General Obasanjo was in office
and the General actually made a contribution to solidarity human rights
by helping to incorporate into the Constitution the "Federal Character"
Doctrine designed to give a sense of belonging to every group in the
country; a Doctrine, as we indicated, the closest to a solidarity right in
the Nigerian Constitution. Ironically and unfortunately, again as previously
indicated, now as a civilian president, General Obasanjo is violating the
very same "national unity" principle he helped create. '
2'
IV. DISCERNING THE SHAPE OF THE PARADOX
A. General Obasanjo's Record
Given the context of widespread human rights abuses during the
military era from 1985 to 1998 outlined in the preceding section,
General Obasanjo's assumption of office in 1999 raised much new hope
for human rights progress. A generality of Nigerians felt that only a
civilian or "democratic" government will halt or reverse the trend of
relentless assault on human rights sired by prolonged military rule.
Many Nigerians were aware of General Obasanjo's suspect record as a
116. OSAGHAE, supra note 66, at 78, 98.
117. TOYIN FALOLA ET AL., THE MILITARY FACTOR IN NIGERIA 1966-1985 39 (1994).
118. OSAGHAE, supra note 66, at 98-99.
119. Id. at 99; FALOLA ET AL., supra note 117, at 39.
120. See, e.g., OSAGHAE, supra note 66, at 104 (concluding that "[i]n essence, the
Nigerian economy remained the peripheral capitalist economy it had been at
independence" under Obasanjo); FALOLA ET AL., supra note 117, at 55 (citing a study
which shows that the country's external debt rose by 325 percent from 1974 to 1979,
including the period of General Obasanjo's stewardship, standing at $6.8 billion as of
1979 when the general left office).
121. See discussions supra note 48 and infra Part IV.B.3.
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democrat both as a military head of state and as a private citizen in the
years after he left office. However, many figured that only a "safe hand"
like him with tentacles to the coup-prone Nigerian military can stabilize
the political system after over fifteen years of developmental decay from
military rule.' 22 It also helped that Nigerians remember General Obasanjo
kindly for transferring government to civilians. 23 Other factors that
appeared to have worked in the general's favor included his high
personal profile' 24 and a shrewdness in making himself over "as all'
things to all manner of people" during his run for the presidency,
125
including the parley of an "authority of personal suffering"'126 emanating
from his imprisonment by General Abacha for an alleged treasonable
plot to overthrow the government. 
2 7
122. See ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 69, at 246 (stating that "[t]he context of
President Obasanjo's election was seen by most international observers as propitious for
a move toward stable democracy"). Cf. Adebayo Williams, Briefing: Nigeria, A
Restoration Drama, 98 AFR. AFF. 407, 409-10 (1999). (Nigerian power brokers went
"for a safe pair of hands that would guarantee the status quo and save the military from
wholesale disgrace and humiliation by an embittered and resentful populace." Id.);
COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 101, 103 (contending that most aspects
of General Abubakar's transition program "were geared seriously toward the smooth
emergence of a successor apparatus that could protect [the departing military's] loot and
afford them security" and that "the dominant raison d'8tre of the entire [transition]
program" was to install Obasanjo as president).
123. RAKE, supra note 113, at 183. Although it sounds strangely ironic that a
general is viewed thankfully for returning power not belonging to soldiers that was
unlawfully taken, what gives his act the poignancy and meaning it had for many
Nigerians was that he was the first to do so after General Gowon (1966-75) had made a
similar promise but failed to keep it. Nigerian military rulers find power so sweet that
only two of the lot that ruled the country conducted a successful transition program
leading to the transfer of power to civilians. Incidentally, Obasanjo, the General power
was transferred to, was the same man who made history as the first to return power to
civilians. In addition, therefore, to being considered a "safe hand", Obasanjo probably
won simply because he kept his promise to surrender power in 1979.
124. See ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 69, at 246.
125. Williams, supra note 122, at 411.
126. Id.
127. See OJo, supra note 102, at 203. Obasanjo served only three years of his
fifteen-year sentence before he was released from prison by General Abubakar (1998-
99) and pardoned in time to run for office in 1999. Williams, supra note 122, at 410;
Guest, supra note 77, at 4. Part of the experience of the authority of personal suffering
Williams talks about is General Obasanjo's persistent reference to God and claim that he
is a "born-again Christian". Obasanjo is just one out of numerous African leaders who
use religion as a means of increasing their bases of popular support. See generally
Stephen Ellis & Gerrie Ter Haar, Religion and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, 36 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 175 (1998); ELIZABETH ISICHEI, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN
AFRICA 339-40 (1995).
Only months to the end of General Obasanjo's term in office, the
expectation of improved human rights under a democratic regime has
not materialized; rather, under his watch, the nation's human rights
picture may have deteriorated rather than seen any improvement. To be
sure, there is a changed atmosphere for the enjoyment of human rights,
thanks to the practice of civil rule that Obasanjo presides over. Indeed,
as the London Economist points out, "Nigeria is a far less fearful place
than it was a couple of years ago. ' " 8 Also, the president has introduced
an array of initiatives that arguably benefits human rights. He has
fought political (or governmental) corruption, grappled with the Niger
Delta crisis, investigated past human rights abuses, and repaired the
country's pariah foreign policy image, among other accomplishments to
his credit.'29 However, in no single area among the three categories of
human rights has any reckon-able progress been made.
Starting with political-civil rights, more than 10,000 people have died
from communal and ethnic-religious conflicts. 30  This does not include
deaths and injuries from the bungling and incompetence of the
government 131 nor liberties unlawfully denied 32 nor valuable private and
public properties destroyed in a society where the per capita income is only
128. Guest, supra note 68, at 4-5.
129. Such as more ready availability of petrol in a country that is a large oil supplier
in the world. Guest, supra note 77, at 5. More carefully considered, some of the
initiatives like the institution of the Oputa Panel are irreducible minimums needed to
move the nation forward that the government really has little choice over. Although, as
we indicated, the panel's reconciliation mandate does not go far enough, for all its
imperfections, the panel garnered for the government critical legitimacy needed to bring
the nation together around any agenda after over fifteen years of divisive and conflict-
ridden rule. See Joseph, supra note 76, at 49 (listing the provision of "as complete an
accounting as possible of the abuse of power since the military seizer power in
December 1983" among the imperatives he said the country needs to become a
"democratizing nation"). See also ANDREW RIGBY, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION (2001)
(indicating that peace and reconciliation commissions are needed in societies wracked by
violent conflict to reconcile people to their recent history and lay foundations for a
peaceful, stable future; these commissions are designed to help individuals and
communities cope with the aftermath of national trauma as well as deal with the impulse
for revenge, among other wrenching issues). With respect to an issue like the repair of the
country's external image battered by military rule, Abubakar's reforms and the termination
of military rule started the process that Obasanjo's coming into office then built on.
130. See Talking Point, Interview by Robin Lustig with Olusegun Obasanjo,
President, Nigeria, Abuja, Nig. (Feb. 16, 2002), at 6 (on file with author).
131. For example, in January 2002, an antiquated military arms depot exploded in a
densely populated area of Lagos, killing more than 1000 people. See Toll in Blast at
Nigerian Army Exceeds 1,000, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, at 6.
132. See Nwabueze Okonkwo, Group Tasks Obasanjo on Awaiting Trial Syndrome,
THISDAY ONLINE (LAGOS), Mar. 28, 2002 (on file with author) (estimating the number of
persons detained while awaiting trial in Nigerian prisons, many of them women and
youths, to be "well over 50,000"). The group in this news report taking Obasanjo to task
is the Rights of Prisoners (ROP), a human rights NGO that concentrates its activities on
issues relating to prisoners.
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$345 a year. Violence arising from increased crime activities has also
grown in the land.133 A trusted member of the president's own cabinet,
the Attorney-General, was assassinated in December 2001 by paid killers
who are still at large.' 34 Turning to socioeconomic rights, the economy is
still in shambles with no light at the end of the tunnel as to any
improvement. 35 Unemployment in Nigeria that, even in the best of times
approaches depression level, has not changed under General Obasanjo.
136
The devaluation of the Naira (the nation's local currency), measured in
exchange rate against the U.S. dollar and other western currencies,
proceeds apace unabated. 37 General Obasanjo defends that the economy
is doing well because, for example, he has increased workers' salaries
several times over what they were when he took office. 138 But this is a
case of the few public employees who have jobs being better paid. Even
so, salary payment by the national government has become so irregular
that public servants now go without pay for many months on end. These
employees include essential-duty workers like police officers. The
situation is much worse at the sub-national levels. There irregular salary
payment, which used to be a (mis)treatment meted only to teachers, has
now extended to other categories of public servants, at times with violent
133. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
134. See Wole Soyinka, Ajibola Ige, An Ecumenical Spirit (Jan. 12, 2002) (funeral
oration for the deceased Attorney-General by the Nobel laureate read at the Liberty
Stadium, Ibadan, on January 11, 2002) (on file with author).
135. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT OF STATE, NIGERIA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES-2000 1 (Feb. 23, 2001) (pointing out that due to a multiplicity of reasons,
including corruption and non-transparent governmental contracting practices, "[t]he
economy has declined for much of the last three decades").
136. Lynda Ikpeazu, Democracy and the Underprivileged, VANGUARD (LAGOS), July 17,
2001, at 29; Tayo Adesanya, Road Map to Economic Growth, THENEwS (LAGOS), July 3, 2000,
at 64 (disclosing that "Nigerians are becoming desperate by the day" and that the economy "is in
coma"); CRP, Things are Getting Worse!, GUARDIAN ONLINE (LAGOS), Apr. 10, 2001, available
at http://www.crp.org.ng/orl00401.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003) (berating General Obasanjo's
economic record); CRP, May Day and the Plight of Nigerian Workers, GUARDIAN ONLINE
(LAGOS), May 1, 2001, available at http://www.crp.org.ng/orl00401.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2003). The Constitutional Rights Project (CRP) is a Nigerian human rights NGO founded in
1990 that has observer status with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Part
of the CRP's human rights activities is the publication of a human fights column that appears
every Tuesday in the Lagos-based daily, The Guardian.
137. By April 2001, the value of the Naira declined to about 4132 to the $1, from
its value of N88 to the $1 in May 1999 when General Obasanjo took office. CRP,
Things are Getting Worse, supra note 136.
138. See Talking Point, supra note 130, at 7. ("Today, an average Nigerian worker takes
home a living wage. Three years ago, an average Nigerian was not on a living wage." Id.).
consequences.139 Some states owe their public employees a backlog of
salaries of up to six months and more. Notice that the president did not
argue that his administration created more jobs, which in many countries
today has become the test of good management of the national economy.
The same lack of progress surrounds solidarity rights. For example, although
the Oputa Panel claimed it reconciled many former adversaries, it, at the same
time dwelled on the lingering crisis in the Niger Delta, 40 and warned,
reading from memoranda and other evidences it received in the course of its
public deliberations across the nation, that the country faces "a simmering
discontent" that, it advised, should not be allowed "to boil over". 141
When he took office, the president faced problems of political-
constitutional reforms, economic crisis, governmental corruption, and
worsening ethnic relations 42 that have been joined since 1999 by major
episodes with equally negative consequences for human rights abuses
that include Odi, 143 Choba,'" Liama, 45 and Benue State. 46 There have
also been atrocities arising from clashes between Christians and
Muslims emanating from the adoption of Islamic Sharia law in the
139. See, e.g., Taye Obateru, Workers Kill Director Over Delayed Salary in Plateau,
VANGUARD (LAGOS), Dec. 3, 2002.
140. Justice Oputa recounted that the sittings in Port Harcourt (in the Niger Delta)
"were dominated by evidence of environmental pollution from oil exploitation and gas
flaring in Ogoniland .... " Ogunsakin, supra note 57.
141. Id.
142. See Reuben Abati, Obasanjo: Matters Arising, May 27, 2001, available at
http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/editorial2/en822701.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003)
(listing those priorities, quoting from the president's inaugural speech following his
swearing in as president, as the crisis in the oil-producing areas; food supply, food
scarcity, and agriculture; corruption; infrastructure; poverty alleviation; health services;
and, political and constitutional dialogue). The President also disclosed in this self-same
speech that "[i]n pursuit of these priorities, I have worked out measures which must be
implemented within the first six months." Id.
143. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.
144. Choba is a community nearby to Odi where the government deployed soldiers to
disperse protesters outside the gates of Willbros Nigeria Ltd., subsidiary of an American
pipeline construction company. Community members reported that the soldiers killed four
people; injured several others, of whom one had his arm amputated; raped about sixty-
seven women; ransacked several stalls near to the company; and, detained twenty-one
youths. The Nigerian press published photographs showing soldiers raping several women,
but the government dismissed the photographs as fake and outrightly denied any rapes. It
also denied that it had deployed soldiers to the community. However, in a special report on
the event that also includes the violation in Odi, Human Rights Watch stated that, although
it cannot verify the figure of sixty-seven rapes alleged by the community, "it seems certain
that soldiers did indeed rape quite a large number of women and killed several people."
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE DESTRUCTION OF ODI AND RAPE IN CHOBA (Dec. 22, 1999) at
11, at http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/dec/nibgl 299.htm.
145. This is a town that, like Odi and Choba, is also in the Niger Delta. Here
Nigerian soldiers burned down about sixty homes and left hundred of people homeless.
See John twori, In Bayelsa, Soldiers Sack Town, Raze 60 Homes, THISDAY ONLINE
(LAGOS), July 2, 2002 (on file with author).
146. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.
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northern part of the country, 147 violations connected with the operations
of ethnic militias, 148 and abuses arising from communal conflicts by
ethnic groups in various parts of the country.149 General Obasanjo faced
enormous challenges when he took office in 1999 and nobody disputes
that the problems were, in many respects, simply daunting. 15° Compared
to his first outing in 1979, the President faced a nation with a "distinctly
somber" mood this second time around.' 5' Some of the unofficial
debriefings or advice the President has received since he took office'
52
were actually a litany of the numerous difficult challenges ahead. 53 The
147. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
148. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (wrrH CENTER FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
EDUCATION), NIGERIA: THE BAKASSI Boys (May 2002). Bakassi Boys consist of a core group of
former shoe salesmen and car-parts dealers who closed their shops to wage war on the armed
bandits plaguing the southeast of the country. The group is named after the shoe market where
these individuals used to work. International and domestic human rights groups castigate this
and other vigilante groups for human rights atrocities such as tortiring people and summarily
executing them. But their formation and operation follow the failure or powerlessness of the
incompetent, corrupt, and underfunded Nigerian police to stem the high wave of crimes in the
country. Bakassi denies that it kills people and maintains that politicians who complain about its
operation have "skeletons in their cupboards." See D'Arcy Doran, Nigerian Vigilantes Hailed as
Heroes, Scorned as Killers, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 8, 2002. See also Peter P. Ekeh, A Review of
HRW's and CLEEN's Report, available at http://waado.org/NigerDelta/Documents/
ConstitutionaMatters/PoliceVigilante/ReviewBakassiBoys (attributing the emergence of
vigilantism to the absence of the state in Nigeria and contending that multiple police formations
are what is needed in the country to overcome the incompetence of the Nigerian Police Force).
149. INTER-CHURCH COALITION ON AFRICA, ICAAF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. THE
SmJATION IN NIGERIA IN 1999/2000 11-12 (Feb. 2000) (listing various communal disputes,
including the ones between Ijaw-Urhobos and Itsekiris, Tivs and Jukun/Kuteb, Yomubas and Hausas
in Shagamu and Kano, Ijaws and Uajes in the Niger Delta, and Ijaws and Yorubas in Lagos).
150. See Guest, supra note 68, at 3 (the list of problems the magazine recounts
includes poverty and indebtedness, ethnic violence, bad roads, unworkable telephones,
idle factories, millions of unemployed youths, no tradition of democracy and of effective
governance, and political corruption); Williams, supra note 122, at 408. (The President
"inherits a polity marked by deep ethnic divisions and discontents, an ailing economy
characterized by structural disequilibrium and disfigured by large-scale looting of the
national treasury, a thoroughly disgraced and humbled military establishment, and a
restive and increasingly militant riverine populace." Id.).
151. Williams, supra note 122, at 408. ("Unlike the euphoria and the wave of
optimism that swept through Nigeria twenty years earlier when Obasanjo drew the
curtain on thirteen years of military dictatorship after a well-organized and brilliantly co-
ordinated transition program, the mood of Nigerians this time is distinctly somber and
generally downbeat." Id.).
152. See, e.g., id. at 407-13; Joseph, supra note 76, at 48-50; Adesanya, supra note
136, at 64-65.
153. See sources cited supra note 152 (including the ominous prediction in
Williams, supra note 122, at 412-13, that if he did not show "outstanding political skills
and unusual personal bravery, Obasanjo may well find he has been handed a poisoned
chalice by his sponsors").
President himself well understood and appreciated the magnitude of the
challenges ahead-and wholeheartedly accepted them. 54  However,
General Obasanjo has performed below expectation.
Nigerian journalists and the public have used words like
"underachieving", "lackluster", and "worse than average" to refer to the
President's performance. 155 After close to one full term in office, the
President has been unable to satisfactorily address or substantially
resolve any one of the priorities he mapped out for himself when he took
office. The Niger Delta crisis still festers, the economy is still in a
coma, 156 no constitutional reform has been forthcoming, 157 and the result
of his effort to curb governmental corruption is mixed.
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Judging performance based on whether the level of conflict in the
country, cumulatively, is decreasing rather than increasing, the President yet
again does not measure well. Much schism followed the annulment of the
presidential election in 1993.159 One account put the level of tension in the
country as General Obasanjo took office as follows: "Nigeria faced its most
serious turmoil and crisis since the Biafran War, and southern concerns
154. In a victory speech following his election, the newly-elected President stated:
I understand the clear message of the Nigerian people. In giving me their
mandate, they have asked me to lead this country by example. They want me
to lead them aright. They want me to restore the dignity of our country. They
want me to revitalize our political institutions and reinvigorate the economy.
They want me to alleviate poverty and to reduce corruption. They want me to
ensure the security of their lives and property. They want justice and equity in
a country they can truly call their own. They want much more.
Olusegun Obasanjo, To Build a New Nigeria, NEWSWATCH (LAGOS), Mar. 15, 1999, at
20. In the same speech, the President also pledged to devote himself "entirely to the
upliftment of' not just Nigerians, but also black people across the world. Id.
155. See Paul Nwabuikwu, Obasanjo as IBB's Campaign Manager, GUARDIAN
ONLINE (LAGOS), May 9, 2001, available at http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/
editorial2/en820906.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) (basing his measurement on issues
like electricity supply, transportation, food, security, and education which he said are
"the indices which determine voter perception of an elected president's performance in
Nigeria"). See also Abati, supra note 142 (listing many problems the problems has yet
to resolve, including economic retrogression and the crisis in the Niger Delta, which he
assessed to be "worse than before").
156. Adesanya, supra note 136, at 64.
157. See discussion infra Part V.C.
158. See John Chiahemen, Nigerian MPs Ask Obasanjo to Resign, Allege Misrule,
REUTERS, Aug. 13, 2002 (on file with author) (quoting an important government source
to the effect that the President's anti-corruptive drive "was showing no sign of
succeeding"); CRP, Corruption: US Exposes Top Government Officials, GUARDIAN
ONLINE (LAGOS), June 12, 2001 (focusing on U.S. media report about top Nigerian
officials who operate foreign accounts in the United States in contravention of Nigerian
regulations and portraying Obasanjo's anti-corruption crusade as "a selective exercise
carried on by the president alone while most of his lieutenants pay lip service"). For a
description of the CRP's identity see discussion supra note 136.
159. OSAGHAE, supra note 66, at 15 (stating that the schisms so "threatened the very
foundations of the country" that "there were widespread fears of it breaking up or
another civil war erupting").
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about northern domination reached new and dramatic heights that talk of
secession returned for the first time since the war. Even Abacha's very
death raised by several notches inter-ethnic tension and distrust."'160 To
what extent has this climate of centrifugal pull/drift changed under General
Obasanjo? The indubitable answer would be not very much, judging from
relentless calls made for a national conference to negotiate the terms for
membership in the union, 161 talks of a looser union (confederation), 162 and
outright threats or movement toward secession in parts of the country. 163 It
is possible, as some have argued, that the heightened tension is that
grievances repressed during the military days are now coming to surface,
taking advantage of the environment of democracy. 164 However, even
allowing for this possibility, civil(ian) rule should reduce or at least stem the
cumulative level of conflict and schism, which it has not done, if the nation
is to claim any progress from such rule. Moments of human rights
violation, since and before independence in Nigeria, have always been
many. But under the President, these moments seem to be increasing rather
than decreasing. 165 The rising level of violence in the country compelled
160. Aka, supra note 48, at 356 (inside quotes omitted).
161. See National Conference: The Way Forward, GUARDIAN ONLINE (LAGOS), June 21,
2001, available at http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/editoria2/en825201.html (last visited Jan.
13, 2003); Southern Governors Demand National Conference, UN INTEGRATED REGIONAL INTO.
NETWORKS, July 9,2002 (on file with author). See also Eddy Odivwri, I'm Not Against Sovereign
National Conference-Obasanjo, THISDAY (LAGOS), June 26,2002 (on file with author).
162. See Ali A. Mazrui, Shariacracy and Federal Models in the Era of Globalization: Nigeria
in Comparative Perspective, Paper Delivered at the International Conference on Restoration of
Shariah in Nigeria: Challenges and Benefits (Mar. 2001), at 1-7 (on file with author).
163. See, e.g., Francis Ndubuisi & Nzeshi Onwuka, Derivation: Niger Delta May
Secede.. ., THISDAY (LAGOS), Aug. 5, 2002 (on file with author); Suleiman
Mohammed, Secession Not Solution to Our Problems-Obasanjo, DAILY TRUST
(ABUJA), May 28, 2002 (on file with author); Moses Ebe Ochonu, On Biafra and Related
Issues, WEEKLY TRUST (ABUJA), Mar. 29, 2002 (on file with author); Amanze Obi,
Coup, Secession, and Selective Amnesia, THISDAY ONLINE (LAGOS), Mar. 17, 2002 (on
file with author); Uba Aham, Biafra, THENEWS (LAGOS), May 21, 2001, at 22-23, 25-
26, 35-36; Amaechi Dike, The Fear of Biafra, ABUJA MIRROR, May 3 1-June 6, 2000 (on
file with author). Ethnic groups that have threatened to leave the union include Igbos,
Yorubas, and groups in the Niger Delta. See also discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
164. See INTER-CHURCH COALITION ON AFRICA, supra note 149, at 12 (stating that
ethnic clashes "represent an overflow of frustrations over social and economic issues
built up during the many years of repressive and corrupt military rule"). See also Guest,
supra note 66, at 15 (stating that "[s]ince the end of military rule, communal violence
has increased, perhaps because the police no longer suppress it so forcefully").
165. See IBB on OBJ: Matters Arising (1), VANGUARD (LAGOS), Dec. 2, 2002,
available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/politics/p328112002.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2003) (suggesting that the president has failed to use his leadership to
forge "national integration among the multiple ethnic nations in the country").
the U.S. government, in August 2002, to issue a travel advisory, warning its
citizens about the hazards of travel to Nigeria. 166 The travel advisory was
sequel to one the State Department issued in April 2000 in the wake of the
mounting ethnic-religious conflicts following the adoption of Islamic Sharia
law in many northern states. 167 What makes these travel advisories significant is
that soon after the installation of civilian government in Nigeria, Washington
removed a U.S. order suspending direct flights to Lagos imposed during the
period of military rule due to alleged ineffective security at the airport. 
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We will conclude this section on a note of two observations concerning the
deficit in human rights that has taken place in Nigeria since 1999. The first is
the fact that political-civil rights, which ordinarily should do better in a
civilian-democratic setting, has, like the other sectors, unfortunately, not been
immune from violation. For example, in response to the high crime wave in
the country, a situation that has led to the deaths of policemen who lose their
lives in encounters with armed robbers, Major-General Victor Malu,
Obasanjo's former Chief of Army Staff, ordered military officers to shoot on
sight any armed robber they found at the scene of robbery. They "should be
shot in the head to ensure that their numbers were drastically reduced ....
[T]here was no point aiming at any other part of the body of an armed suspect
but the head." 169 When he gave this order in October 1999, over twenty-six
policemen had lost their lives in encounters with armed robbers. 70 But this
would still not justify shooting these suspects on sight, certainly not in a
society supposedly under the rule of law and which calls itself a democracy.
More recently, following the vandalizing or burning of police stations in parts
of the country, Tafa Balogun, Inspector-General of the country's police force,
ordered his officers to shoot on sight any rioters who attack police barracks.
"Your duty is to defend your barracks against mob action," he said. "Shoot
and kill whenever they want to attack your barracks .... All I want to hear is
that as they were trying to bum a police station or barracks that no fewer than
a certain number, say 45, were killed in the process."' 7' Actions like these
both highlight the government's low regard for political-civil rights and
betray the low quality of the country's incipient democracy.
166. Nigeria-Travel Warning issued August 8, 2002, U.S. Department of State,
Consular Information Sheet for Nigeria, Aug. 28, 2002.
167. Id. Unfavorable conditions, which the Department cited in this latest advisory
include violent crime, kidnapping for ransom of persons associated with the petroleum
industry in the Niger Delta, still ongoing religious and ethnic conflicts between Muslim and
Christian groups and between other ethnic groups, problems arising from implementation
of Islamic Sharia law, and danger of financial loss arising from scam operations.
168. Aka, supra note 65, at 256.
169. COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 9.
170. Id.
171. Nigeria: Shoot Anti-Police Rioters on Sight, Law Enforcers Told, IRIN, Oct.
21, 2002 (on file with author).
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The second observation is that human rights violations abroad by Nigerian
peacekeepers that existed during the military era has continued under General
Obasanjo. Nigerian military forces in Sierra Leone played a major and
important role in saving lives and securing peace in that troubled land.
However, genuine concerns of human rights violations by these forces also
exist. Serious human rights abuses, ranging from summary executions of
suspected rebels and their collaborators, extortions, brutality, and excessive use
of force, perpetrated by Nigerian soldiers serving under the Economic
Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone
have been documented. 72 The lesson to be drawn from this unfortunate
occurrence is that promoting human rights in foreign relations can be an
onerous and unmanageable additional responsibility for a government, such as
Nigeria's, which lacks a culture of respecting human rights at home for its own
citizens. However, the occurrence spells setback for a country that must aspire
to be a constitutional democracy within the shortest possible time-period.
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Nigeria "can play an important role in articulating Africa's contributions to
democratic construction."' 174 As Professor Joseph advises, if the country has
any goal remaining to shoot for, that goal is the destiny to "become one of the
most important nurseries of democratic theorizing and construction during
the coming decade,"'175 entailing projection of positive values abroad
176
peacekeeping atrocities, unfortunately, can only serve to diminish.
B. Assessing General Obasanjo 's Record: Analysis of Four Crises
The manner in which the President has handled a number of crises just
reinforces the assessment of his performance as below average. Four of
these crises explored here are: 1) the Niger Delta trouble; 2) the Sharia
quagmire; 3) the secession conundrum; and, 4) the military reprisals in
Odi and Benue State. These crises are chosen for two reasons. The first is
the substantial ramifications they portend for human rights in the country
(Table 1). The second is because, by their complexity, these crises typify
the problems a Nigerian leader will face. Finally, note that none of the
172. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 8-9. ECOMOG consists of military
troops from seven West African countries, including Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone, and Senegal. Nigeria leads the coalition.
173. Joseph, supra note 76, at 49.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 50. ("Why not create a Radio Free Nigeria that can carry on the [pro-
democracy] mission of Radio Kudirat to the rest of the continent?" Id.).
crises, with probably the exception of the last, is actually new. Even the last
is not very new, as we will see when we get to the topic. There is no
intention to engage in a comprehensive treatment; rather, this is a cursory
discussion on the crises that zeros in on their ramifications for human rights.
Table 1
Major Episodes Involving Human Rights
Violations under General Obasanjo
CRISIS HUMAN RIGHTS RAMIFICATIONS
1. Niger Delta trouble An issue of mainly solidarity
and socioeconomic rights with
repercussions for political-civil
rights.
2. Sharia quagmire An issue of political-civil rights and
solidarity rights driven by hard
economic times (socioeconomic
rights) as an aggravating underlying
factor.
3. Secession conundrum An issue of mainly solidarity rights
aggravated by hard economic times
(socioeconomic rights) with
repercussions for political-civil rights
as the government increasingly uses
force to suppress popular protest.
4. Military Reprisals at Odi and An issue of political-civil rights
Benue State connected with solidarity rights and
aggravated by hard economic times
(variables related to socioeconomic
rights).
1. The Niger Delta Problem
Large-scale violence characterized the relationship between oil
producing areas and the government before General Obasanjo took
office. 177 What made the Niger Delta the human rights crisis it is and a
177. See Aka, supra note 48, at 347; JEDREZEJ G. FRYNAS, OIL IN NIGERIA: CONFLICT
AND LITIGATION BETWEEN OIL COMPANIES AND VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 54 (2000) (stating that
government security measures aimed against anti-oil protesters included extra-judicial
killings, rapes, arbitrary arrests, beating and floggings, harassment, and intimidation).
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threat to political stability is "ft]he reliance of past regimes on repressive
tactics over dialogue, and their repeated failure to address the Delta's
fundamental problems .. ,,78 The problem was one that called for
political dialogue as opposed to any violent suppression of popular
protest. 179 The President pledged himself to pursue that dialogue when
he took office. 180 However, that is a promise breached, not kept. For
rather than seek a peaceful solution, the government deployed large
numbers of soldiers and Mobile Police (a branch of the Nigerian Police
notorious for its brutality) troops in the Niger Delta.18" ' It also
established a special task force to protect oil pipelines that in 2000
carried out several extrajudicial executions in oil-producing communities
in Delta State. 18 The victims, which included children ranging from eight
to fourteen years, were persons suspected of vandalizing pipelines or
stealing petroleum products. 
83
There are two plausible conclusions that may be drawn from the
government's "handling" of this problem. The first is that the
government still resorts to the same repressive strategy that failed
woefully in the past. This does not bespeak political vision for a
democratic government. The second is that the government is more
interested in protecting oil pipelines than it is in protecting human rights
and resolving the crisis. 184 The President's poor handling of the Niger
Delta crisis led directly to the atrocities in Odi, Choba, and Liama.
During an address to the nation on October 1, 2002 to mark the
anniversary of the country's forty-second independence, General
Obasanjo promised to submit a bill to the National Assembly that would
178. AFRICA POLICY INFORMATION CENTER, STRATEGIC ACTION ISSUE AREA:
NIGERIA, n.d. (on file with author).
179. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 10; INTER-CHURCH COALITION ON
AFRICA, supra note 149, at 16. ("The military and paramilitary police cannot be
expected to establish an atmosphere of calm and security in the Delta and are more likely
to commit violations themselves." Id.).
180. Obasanjo, supra note 154, at 20. ("My first duty and priority is to reconcile
the people of this country and heal their wounds." Id.).
181. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 5.
182. Id.
183. Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NIGERIA: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT (2001),
available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/africa/nigeria.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
184. This unfortunate "solution" calls to mind what Professors Aborisade and
Mundt said concerning the difficulty of ending autocratic rule in a petroleum economy:
"[C]ontrol the spigot and the narrow slice of the populations that operate and protect it,
render helpless or neutralize opponents," and safely ignore the rest. ABORISADE &
MUNDT, supra note 69, at 247.
allocate thirteen percent of oil earnings to oil-producing areas in what he
called "the beginning of our renewed efforts to correct the unfairness" to
the Niger Delta.1 85 So less than one year to the end of his presidency,
there is still no viable solution in sight to the Niger Delta crisis. Thus,
then, on this issue, it is fair to say that government policy appears to
have changed little from what it was in 1980, when a former permanent
secretary in the Federal Ministry of Mines and Power audaciously told
the oil-producing areas to their face without mincing words that given
their "small size and population," no matter the amount of their
grievances and resentment, "that they could not threaten the stability of
the country nor affect its continued economic development."'
' 86
One recent development relating to a lawsuit the Ogonis brought against
the Nigerian national government at the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights supports a contention of lack of due seriousness on the
government's part in addressing the Niger Delta question. The govemment
made one submission to the Commission that acknowledged the widespread
destruction wrought in Ogoniland by oil exploration and the security forces.
Yet, it did not participate in the case and failed to reply to repeated
Commission requests about whether relief for the plaintiffs might be
accorded through Nigerian courts.187 As a result, the Commission declared
that no apparent domestic remedy was available and that the plaintiffs were
right to appeal to the Commission.188 In addition to proving that the
government does not take the problem seriously, the occurrence also
supports the contention, such as that made by Fareed Zakaria, concerning
the low commitment of illiberal democracies to human rights. 89
2. The Sharia Quagmire
Twelve out of the nineteen northern states in the country have adopted
Islamic Sharia law as legal system since General Obasanjo took
office.' 90 Many of these states declaring Sharia law adopted the Maliki
tradition, which mandates the strictest interpretation of the Koran but
with less than onerous evidentiary requirement. 19  Under this
interpretation, for example, an adulterer's pregnancy by itself alone is
perfect proof of guilt (non-onerous evidence) where the punishment is
185. Olusegun Obasanjo, Address to the Nation to Mark the 42nd Anniversary of
the Country (Oct. 1, 2002) (on file with author).
186. See Aka, supra note 48, at 340.
187. Nigerian domestic law incorporates the ACHPR. Lobe, supra note 34.
188. Id.
189. See discussion infra Part V.A.
190. These Sharia states include Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano,
Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara.
191. See Richard Dowden, Death by Stoning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at 28.
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death by stoning (strict interpretation of the Koran). 92 The Sharia states
insist that these laws are needed to curb growing crimes in the country
that the secular penal code, in their view, does not effectively address,' 93
but the real motivation behind these declarations is a political protest by
the affected northern states designed to complicate matters for General
Obasanjo for allegedly neglecting the North in his administration.
194
The declaration of Sharia law has led to numerous violent clashes
between Muslim and Christian groups in various parts of the country
that have resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries, as well as
destruction of valuable public and private properties estimated at
millions of dollars. 95 Prominent Nigerians like Professor Wole Soyinka,
regard, not incorrectly, the replacement of the secular penal code with
Sharia law that occurs in the Sharia states as effective acts of secession
from the country. 196 At any rate, the declarations violate the Nigerian
Constitution' 9 and international human rights instruments to which the
country is a party. These include the ICCPR and the Convention on the
192. Id.
193. There is no study, to our knowledge, validating the claim that Sharia law is a
more effective deterrent to crimes than the secular penal code.
194. The North has dominated political power since the birth of the country in 1960
and is not, unlike the Igbos and ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta, neglected
developmentally. Even under General Obasanjo, the North still holds the vice
presidency and important ministerial positions like defense, finance, and petroleum. The
real basis of northern complaint of "marginalization" under General Obasanjo is a fear
that the days of its domination of national politics may soon be over.
195. See, e.g., Obiora Chukwumba, Tension in the Land, TELL (LAGOS), Nov. 22,
1999, at 14-19, 22; D'Arcy Doran, Nigerian City Shell-Shocked After Anti-U.S. Riots,
REUTERS, Oct. 14, 2001 (on file with author). In Kaduna State alone, Christian-Muslim
riots in 2000 left up to 5000 people dead.
196. See Wole Soyinka, The Last Presidential Visitor?, NIGERIA WORLD, Aug. 25,
2000. In this article released just before then U.S. president William J. Clinton visited
the country, Professor Soyinka stated ominously that President Clinton "may prove to be
the last serving U.S. president to have visited a nation called Nigeria." Id.
197. The Constitution prohibits sub-national governments from adopting an official
religion, but allows states to elect to use Islamic or Sharia customary law and courts,
taking into account the substantiality of the Muslim population of the country. People
who defend the constitutionality of promoting Sharia law to penal code in the country
cite to the provision in the Constitution that states that a Sharia court of appeal may
exercise "such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the law of the State."
But such argument is unavailing because it misses the real issue. Sharia has existed in
the country long before now but has never been elevated from personal law to penal code
because of the religious-pluralism of the country. The compromise worked out by the
Constituent Assembly in 1978 permitting Sharia appeals in the 1979 Constitution did not
provide authorization for promotion of Sharia law, which has always been recognized in
the country as personal family law, into criminal code.
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW),'98 both of which the country has ratified, and the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT),' 99 which the country signed but has yet to ratify.00
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture has confirmed that punishments
such as amputation and flogging imposed by Sharia courts in the North
breach the CAT. 20  Also, many of the restrictions imposed on women
are equally breaches of the CEDAW.0 2
The President responded to the rash of declarations by doing nothing.
He said he regarded the adoptions as the use of religion for political ends
that would not last because they were not right.203  The excuse is
unsophisticated for a political actor with the experience of the President
and is unpersuasive. A proper handling of this delicate crisis should, at
the very least, have consisted of the government's seeking an advisory
opinion from the highest court of the land on the constitutionality of
these adoptions, as a number of the human rights NGOs in the country
advised 4.2  Without condemning these declarations, General Obasanjo
has repeatedly expressed his personal distaste for Sharia punishments.2 5
But the real worry for the President, known for his knack for
international approval, is the negative effect of Sharia implementation on
the perception of the country abroad and the democratic pretenses of the
government. International human rights NGOs have petitioned the
government concerning imposition of harsh punishments by Sharia
courts, including the imposition of death by stoning on poor northern
women convicted of extra-marital sex.206 This was the driving reason
198. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
199. Convention Against Torture (CAT), G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
200. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 6.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 95, at 13 (where, in answer to a question from
two U.S. reporters, Obasanjo answered that "political Shar'ia is new and [it] will come
and go, because if you want to use Shar'ia to achieve political ends it will not hold...
unless you use what is right, whatever else you use doesn't last" ). The question to the
President that evoked this answer was how a person like himself can "manage a nation in
which a chunk of it seems to be governed by a different set of laws." Id.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NIGERIA: WOMAN SENTENCED TO DEATH
UNDER SHARIA (Oct. 23, 2001); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NIGERIA: REVERSE WOMAN'S
SENTENCE OF DEATH BY STONING (Oct. 23, 2001) (a Human Rights Watch letter to
General Obasanjo); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AMPUTATION BY A SHARI'A COURT (Oct. 15,
2001) (a Human Rights Watch letter to General Obasanjo); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
NIGERIA: TEENAGE MOTHER WHIPPED (Jan. 23, 2001). Among these groups is the
National Organization of Women (NOW), which has marched in front of the Nigerian
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for his Attorney-General's dispatch of a circular letter in spring 2002 to
the Sharia governors in which the top government lawyer complained
about disparity in the allocation of punishment against Muslims, calling
such discriminatory punishment unconstitutional and "against equity and
good conscience." 207 But even this obviously timid action was quickly
nullified by the President's subsequent argument that the country is a
multi-religious rather than a secular state.2°8
"Explanations" like the President's miss out on the real issue, namely:
that Sharia law, until now, has never been penal code or plenary legal
system in the country. That was the import of the Constituent Assembly
decision in 1978 refusing to create a federal Sharia court of appeals.209
It is true that Sharia has a long history in the North that goes back to the
end of the nineteenth century. However, the practice has been a gradual
but progressive removal of the harsher punishment of Islamic law in the
country and full Sharia was never introduced, taking into account, to use
the President's language, the multi-religious character of the country.
210
Advocates of full Sharia are yet to persuade anyone why the penal code
is no longer adequate after this long usage to tackle crimes in the land.
Such explanation is necessary considering that, as one analyst correctly
points out, the penal code introduced in the North beginning in 1960
integrated elements of Islamic law.211 Because the Obasanjo government
failed to act to deal with this problem, the violations coming from Sharia
implementation are, as the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
argues in an appeal to the President over a ruling on August 19, 2002,
upholding the penalty of death by stoning of a woman for engaging in
212extra-marital sex, imputed to his government.
A fact that makes the President's handling of this problem particularly
unsatisfactory is that the problem is one that has been building for a long
time. Besides the Constituent Assembly controversy of 1978 over the
Embassy in Washington, D.C. with placards such as "Follow the law and not the Cleric",
"Ho, Ho! Hey, Hey! Religious extremists go home and pray!", and "Rocks are for
gardens, not to hurt women".
207. See Emmanuel Onwubiko, Nigeria Declares Sharia Rule Illegal, GUARDIAN
ONLINE (LAGOS), Mar. 21, 2002 (on file with author).
208. Musa Aliyu & Mustapha I. Kwaru, Nation Not a Secular State-Obasanjo,
DAILY TRUST (ABUJA), Feb. 18, 2002 (on file with author).
209. OSAGHAE, supra note 66, at 90-91.
210. Dowden, supra note 191, at 28.
211. Id.
212. Copy of letter received via private e-mail on file with author.
213issue,  military leaders mixed politics and religion such that during the
Babangida years, "religious conflict between Muslim and Christians led to
repeated instances of mass-level violence" "to a degree previously unknown in"
the country.214 In short, as religion scholar Elizabeth Isichei puts it, although in
the period after the civil war, "[m]any Christians in the South accepted Muslim
political dominance, preferring this to the risk of further bloodshed ... an
underlying tension" always existed that threatened to explode any time into
open religious conflict." 5 The trouble with Sharia is not the limb cut in
enforcing that law as penal code, though that also is a major problem. It is the
general environment of repression enforcement of Islamic law can engender in
an ethnically diverse and religiously pluralistic society like Nigeria, especially
one that now calls itself a democracy.2 6 But in addition to not promoting inter-
ethnic and inter-religious harmony, the adoption of Sharia in the North is also a
pointed attack on what little rights women had before in that part of the country.
Professor Ali A. Mazrui, in well-publicized lectures in defense of the
North,217 argues that Sharia declaration in northern Nigeria is only one form
of acts of "cultural self-determination" or nationalism within Nigeria that
major ethnic groups in the country, including Igbos and Yorubas, are
218engaging themselves in. There are three main problems with this position.
213. See supra notes 197 and 209 and accompanying texts.
214. Diamond, supra note 75, at 448. For details of these mass-level conflicts see
OSAGHAE, supra note 66, at 250-5 1. Such mixture of religion and politics included the
predominance of Muslims in the various military regimes beginning with General
Buhari; and, the Babangida government's action, in 1986, stealthily enrolling Nigeria as
a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). See FALOLA ET AL., supra
note 117, at 117-20. Before 1986, Nigeria, for reason even then hard to comprehend for
a secular country, held observer status in the organization. Id. at 117.
215. ISICHEI, supra note 127, at 342.
216. See Daniel Pipes & Jonathan Schanzer, Militant Islam's New Strongholds,
N.Y. POST ONLINE, Oct. 22, 2002. ("Implementing Islamic law means forbidding such
practices as construction of churches, music performances, the wearing of pants,
drinking alcohol, and riding in mixed-gender taxis. Forced conversions to Islam are
reported, as well as coerced divorces of Muslim women from Christian men." Id.).
217. Mazrui, supra note 162, at 1-7; Etim Imisim, Why North Regrets Investing in
Obasanjo-Ali Mazrui, THISDAY ONLINE (LAGOS), Apr. 3, 2002, available at
http://www.thisdayonline.com/news/20020403news I6.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
218. Mazrui, supra note 162, at 1; Imisim, supra note 217. Professor Mazrui contended
that part of "what the debate about Shariacracy is all about" is that "Nigeria is the only African
country outside Arab Africa which has seriously debated an alternative to the Western
constitutional and legal inheritance." Id. at 7. What is strange about this one-party "debate" is
that the secularism of the country, given its nature as a patchwork of ethnic nationalities, is not in
question. That secularism was challenged but affirmed when in 1978, again, as now, under
Obasanjo's rule, the country refused the introduction of Sharia courts at the federal level. Mazrui
maintains that it is possible to implement Sharia in a country without compromising the
particular country's secularism. What makes this argument unpersuasive is that Sharia represents
for Muslims a complete way of life that does not co-exist or comport with any other system. The
promotion of Islamic law from personal family law into complete legal code in the North is a
major constitutional development that is bound to have far-reaching ramifications for the
Nigerian political system that no amount of scholarly rationalization will minimize.
[VOL. 4: 209, 2003] Nigeria Since May 1999
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
The first is that what the Sharia north is doing, changing the country's
secular status by abrogating the uniform penal code of the country and
replacing it with Sharia law, is something that rises beyond mere plain
expression of nationalism; it is an act of effective secession from the
country, as Professor Soyinka reasoned. The fact that the Sharia north did
not call their action secession from the country is immaterial so long as it
has that effect. So although the northern expression is truly cultural
self-determination or nationalism, it is an expression outside, not within,
the Nigerian state. As Professor Mazrui himself puts it, the "problem
posed by the Sharia debate is whether a federal system is able to support
cultural self-determination of its constituent parts and still retain
cohesion as a federation. 219  The plain and unequivocal answer to his
rhetorical question as to whether Sharia can be "implemented at state level
without compromising secularism at the federal level ' 220 is that it cannot.
The same is true of some of the expressions of nationalisms from other
groups in the country that have accompanied the expression the Sharia
north engaged in. As discussion of the secession crisis below indicates,
those nationalistic responses are occurring outside, not within, the Nigerian
state. This is particularly the case with the Igbos who are trying to re-
establish, using peaceful means, an independence for which they
unsuccessfully fought from 1967 to 1970.221
The second problem with Professor Mazrui's position derives from his
suggestion or implication that these expressions of cultural self-
determination by the major ethnic groups in Nigeria are contemporaneous.
They are not. Expression of Igbo nationalism was sequel to and a reaction
to northern expression. It followed the declarations and accompanying
violence from clashes between Muslim and Christians in parts of the
country that led to the death of thousands of innocent people, a substantial
majority of them Igbos.222 In order of occurrence, the Sharia declarations
preceded this latest expression of Igbo nationalism.
219. Mazrui, supra note 162, at 7.
220. Id.
221. Mike Palo, From Washington DC to a Troubled Nigeria (RADIO NETH. radio
broadcast Nov. 9, 2001) (on file with author).
222. Chukwumba, supra note 195, at 14-19, 22; Palo, supra note 221 (indicating that
Igbo striving for independence today "had in fact begun from" killings that occur from
ethnic-religious unrest similar to the one they experience in 1966). An opening prayer
broadcast on September 15, 2001, on the Voice of Biafra International (VOBI) described in
graphic terms the atrocities unleashed on Igbos by "fanatical Muslims", ending with a
petition to God to "[bly your great power, free us from the curse of Islamic bondage ..
Id. For more on this new radio station see infra text accompanying notes 236-37.
The third and final problem is Professor Mazrui's portraiture of the
declarations as a (helpless) response to globalization. 223  The
portraiture is unconvincing. The declarations have little to do with
external influence and everything to do with Nigerian internal
politics, particularly the intention of the North to get back at
Obasanjo, after they have helped used their vote to put him in office
with the clear understanding that he would protect northern interests
(read northern domination), but which he has failed to do since he
came into office, hence the sudden "marginalization" of the North.224
Mazrui's position that Northerners' holding political office for the
numerous years they did pre-1999 "for a while camouflaged" their
economic marginalization, which disadvantage he said became
exposed once General Obasanjo, a non-Northerner, took office as
225president, is interesting but without merit.
3. The Secession Conundrum
Another problem, additional to the first two, General Obasanjo has
displayed below average ability in handling is the secession conundrum.
The rash of Sharia declarations and implementations in the North is an
act of effective secession from the country that is, however, not covered
here, having been analyzed already. That leaves us only with the South
as focus of analysis. Three groups or collection of groups in this region
who have threatened or moved toward secession since the President
came into office are Igbos, Yorubas, and communities in the Niger
22Delta. 26 Of the three, the two ethnic groups that have made the most
advance in this option are Igbos and Yorubas. The Yoruba move for
self-determination outside Nigeria pre-dated Obasanjo's second coming;
it goes back to 1993 with the annulment of the presidential elections of
that year presumed to have been won by a Yoruba, Chief Moshood
Abiola. Although Yoruba secessionism has "not entirely disappeared,
' 227
that option appears to have waned since Obasanjo, who is Yoruba, took
office. 228 The situation leaves out Igbos as the one ethnic group under
Obasanjo that have pursued the secessionist option with the most intensity
and it is on this group that the rest of this discussion mostly revolves.
223. For a recent extended analysis of this concept see Aka, supra note 12, at 415-22.
224. See Minabere Ibelema, Nigeria: The Politics of Marginalization, 99 CURRENT
HIST. 211-14 (2000).
225. Mazrui, supra note 162, at 7.
226. See discussion supra note 163.
227. ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 69, at 246.
228. Id. See also Reuben Abati, Obasanjo, Secession and the Secessionists (2),
GUARDIAN ONLINE (LAGOS), Dec. 23, 2001 (maintaining that Yorubas, unlike Igbos, talk
secession but never "cross the line" in terms of actually seceding).
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Recent Igbo effort for independent self-determination took off in May
2000 when the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of
Biafra (MASSOB), led by Ralph Uwazurike, an Igbo lawyer, embarked
on a program aimed at resurrecting the defunct Biafra Republic whose
demise followed the defeat of Igbos in the civil war.229 In a petition it
sent to the United Nations, MASSOB conveyed that,
The said Biafra is currently struggling to gain independence from Nigeria. We,
therefore, under the present circumstance, humbly apply to be admitted,
registered or treated, as the case may be, as an unrepresented nation in any of
the organs of the United Nations, having renounced our Nigerian nationality.
230
MASSOB stated that its campaign for the actualization of Biafra would
be non-violent and non-exodus.231 It explained that the motivation
behind its launching of what it called New Biafra was, like in 1967, the
"unprovoked and organized killing[s]" of Igbos, which had continued
232unabated, 2. It said the recent killings had been triggered by the
adoption of Sharia law in northern states in the country that had led to
violent clashes between Christians and Muslims in various parts of the
country.233 In particular, it cited the crisis in Kaduna, a cosmopolitan
city in the North with a substantial Christian population, where an
estimated 5000 Igbos died.234 Replying to his Igbo critics, especially
Igbo governors said to have reaffirmed their resolve in "one Nigeria,"
MASSOB maintained that none of the dissenting voices has any answer
concerning the safety of Igbo life and property in Nigeria.235
229. Organizations advocating for Igbo sovereign self-determination have been born
before 2000 when MASSOB made its outing. For example, Ekwe Nche, a pan-lgbo
nationalist organization based in Chicago, Illinois adopted a constitution on February 19, 1999
that has as one of its objectives, "striv[ing] for the peaceful actualization of the Sovereign
State of Biafra." See Ekwe Nche ORG. CONST. § 2.5.1 (on file with author). I am grateful to
Professor Justin K. Akujieze of Chicago State University for this information.
230. Chukwuma, supra note 195, at 17.
231. Toye Olori, Igbos Resurrect Biafra Secessionist Bid, INTERPRESS NEWS SERVICE,
May 29, 2000 (on file with author). The Movement elaborated that "[i]ndependence is different
from overthrowing of government. Independence goes with negotiation. We are negotiating
Biafra's independence." Id. "Non-exodus" means that in actualizing New Biafra, Igbos would




235. Id. Position such as MASSOB's appears validated by the fact that Igbo traders
the president tried to console during a visit to Kano replied with "Give Us Biafra." The
Igbos lost their properties in Kano as a result of deadly clashes between Christians and
Muslims in this metropolitan northern city that followed the U.S. bombing of
Afghanistan in the war against terrorism.
But the campaign for peaceful re-establishment of Biafra's independence
appears to be something beyond MASSOB and the Igbo governors;
numerous organizations of Igbos in exile have emerged that are doing
abroad what MASSOB is doing at home. Visible handiworks of these
motley of actualization organizations include the formation of a Biafra
House designed as a nucleus for a full-fledged Biafran Embassy in the
United States upon formalization of Igbo independence; and, the unveiling
of an underground radio, Voice of Biafra International (VOBI), based in the
United States, that beams messages into Igboland and other parts of
Nigeria.236 The radio station hit the airwaves effective September 200 1.237
The Obasanjo government's response to these gestures of secession
has been that nobody gets out of the country without a fight. "We can
find a peaceful way of living together in harmony," the President said,
but "[tihere is no peaceful way of getting out of Nigeria., 238 Consistent
with this hard-line position, the government has brutalized and
persecuted groups like MASSOB engaged in peaceful and nonviolent
agitation for independence. 239 About 3000 members of MASSOB have
been killed by Nigerian security forces since 1999.240 The number does
not include people detained indefinitely without trial.241 There are a
number of problems with this "handling" of the crisis.
First, by high-handedly suppressing mere advocacy, the government is
violating the constitutional rights of these organizations seeking
independence "to freely and non-violently express their opinions and
thoughts. 242 As one Nigerian human rights NGO argued, in condemning
police brutalities on MASSOB, "[a]s long as [the organization] carries
out its activities in a peaceful and non-violent manner without coercing
or forcing support from the people, it is perfectly within its rights under
the Constitution. 243
236. Palo, supra note 221.
237. Id.
238. Muyiwa Adeyemi & Isa Abdulsalami, We Can Find Peaceful Living...,
THISDAY ONLINE (LAGOS), Dec. 7, 2001 (on file with author).
239. See, e.g., Anayo Okoli, Police Swoop on MASSOB, Closes H[ead]q[uarters],
VANGUARD (LAGOS), Nov. 5, 2002 (on file with author) (reporting a police raid of the
group's office in Onitsha during which at least one person was killed); Gordi Udeajah,
Police Arraign 17 MASSOB Members for Treasonable Felony, GUARDIAN ONLINE
(LAGOS), Oct. 29, 2002; CRP, Police Brutalities on MASSOB, GUARDIAN ONLINE
(LAGOS), Feb. 13, 2001 (commenting on a siege on the headquarters of MASSOB, the
second time in less than two months, at the end of which "houses were again burnt,
deaths were recorded, and severe injuries inflicted").
240. See Emma Amaize, 3,000 MASSOB Members Killed, Group Alleges,
VANGUARD (LAGOS), Nov. 13, 2002 (on file with author).
241. See Uwem Umo, Court Orders l[nspector]-G[eneral of] P[olice] to Release
MASSOB Detainees, DAILY TRUST (ABUJA), Nov. 18, 2002 (on file with author).
242. CRP, supra note 239.
243. Id.
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Second, in ruling out and making peaceful change impossible,
General Obasanjo is, in other words, as President John F. Kennedy
would say it, wittingly or unwittingly making revolutionary change
inevitable. This is especially the case in a country like Nigeria where,
as we indicated earlier, the major ethnic groups have had an extremely
difficult time finding a peaceful way of living together in harmony.
44
It is probably in realization of this difficulty in living together that
years ago, as a private citizen, the President advocated insertion of a
clause for secession in the country's Constitution.245
Third, the hard-line posture betrays a double standard in the
government's response to what it perceives as threats to the country's
integrity. The government chose to do nothing when Sharia law was
declared and implemented in the North but is persecuting groups agitating
for independence. The effect of both expressions is the same. Both are
agitations for self-determination outside the Nigerian state; the only
difference is that one, the agitation for independence, is more pointed and
direct. Can it then be that the government is disbursing punishment based
on which expression of independence outside the state is more pointed?
The government has no constitutional justification to do this any more
than it has the right to punish mere advocacy and dissent.
Fourth, persecuting groups agitating for independence glosses over the fact
that some of the recent secessionist movements in the country are a response
to Sharia adoptions in the North as well as the killings and the climate of
insecurity those declarations or adoptions engendered. This is particularly the
case with Igbos who, as an ethnic group, have borne the brunt of the killings
and destructions in the North arising from the clashes between Christians and
Muslims in the aftermath of Sharia adoptions in that region. Now, as when
they seceded in 1967, the Igbos complain that the national government has
failed to guarantee their safety and protect their fives and properties.246
Fifth, related to the last, the government's "tough-stance" response glosses
over fundamental problems of the country that give vent to secession. Talks
of secession "are signifiers" that "point to serious distortions within the
polity. '247 After the civil war, the national government announced a
reconstruction program designed to reintegrate Igbos into the Nigerian
244. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
245. See discussion infra note 388.
246. Palo, supra note 221.
247. Reuben Abati, Obasanjo, Secession and the Secessionists (3), GUARDIAN
ONLINE (LAGOS), Dec. 30, 2001 (on file with author).
249
polity.248 But the program was insincerely executed and never worked.249 As
a result, rather than any rehabilitation, the fate and experience of Igbos since
the end of the war have been one of exclusion and neglect in national
appointments 250 as well as in the distribution of projects, amenities,
opportunities, and related infrastructure.25' Igbos have complained, to no avail,
about their marginalization in Nigerian national life.252 Igbo marginalization
is a cumulative one of a kind no other ethnic group in the country suffers and
therefore deserving of urgent alleviation in a regime, especially a democratic
one, committed to equity and social justice. The East was the theater of the
Biafra war whose scars still remain because, as we said, the planned
reconstruction never happened. Also, some of the ethnic groups in the oil-
producing area, such as the Etches and lkwerre in the Niger Delta are Igbos.
In short, Igbos bear a double burden of neglect the result of being an oil-
producing area and the location of Igboland as a theater of a brutal war whose
effects to date still lingers.2 5 A factor that reinforces the rankle and sense of
injury arising from this marginalization is that the wealth of the nation, since
the birth of the country controlled by non-Easterners, come from the East.
254
Even though Igbo support was instrumental in the win that brought General
Obasanjo into office, this neglect has continued unabated under his
government. In comparison to the other two major ethnic groups in the
country, the President excludes Igbos in his administration,255 and in the
248. Aka, supra note 48, at 338-41.
249. Id. at 338-43. See also Alexandra Zavis, Biafra's Shadow, ASSOCtATED PRESS, Mar.
13, 2000 (on file with author). ("Despite a flurry of reconstruction during Nigeria's 1970s oil
boom, part of national reconciliation efforts, the southeast has since been left in decline." Id.).
250. See Beko Ransome-Kuti, Vision for New Nigeria, THENEWS (LAGOS), Dec. 20,
1999, at 48 (noting that "[slince the civil war[,] one can hardly see an Igbo in any
prominent position in government institutions in Nigeria").
251. See, e.g., Aka, supra note 48, at 327-61; CHINUA ACHEBE, THE TROUBLE WITH
NIGERIA 45-50 (1983) (discussing "the Igbo problem"). See generally JOE IGBOKWE,
IGBOS TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER BIAFRA (1995).
252. See sources cited supra note 251. Marginalization is a term in Nigeria seldom
applied to majority groups, but Igbo marginalization arises from their defeat in the civil war
and government policy since after the war designed to check and contain, rather than
reintegrate, them into the political system. Aka, supra note 48, at 337-38. See generally
IGBOKWE, supra note 251. For its theme, the work draws on the idea of Russian writer Leo
Tolstoy (1828-1910), to paint a poignant picture of Igbo dilemma in Nigeria: "I sit on a man's
back, choking him and making him carry me, and yet assure myself and others that I am very
sorry for him and wish to ease his lot by all possible means-except by getting off his back."
Id. at v; see also the vivid pictorial illustration of this imagery on the book's cover.
253. Put differently, what makes the situation of the East a veritable double
jeopardy is that this single regibn houses two marginalized communities, namely, Igbos
and oil-producing minorities, which include Igbos.
254. IGBOKWE, supra note 251, at vi (stating that "over 80 percent" of the country's
wealth comes from the East).
255. See Dike, supra note 163 (pointing out that the President excluded Igbos in the
appointment of Service Chiefs, and that there was no single Igbo among the thirty-six
police commissioners in the country that the President appointed).
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sitting of federal amenities and industries. Under General Obasanjo, most
national projects have gone to the Yoruba southwest to the neglect of other parts
of the country. Federal roads in that part of the country have been
reconstructed; however, those in Igboland and the rest of the eastern region,
destroyed during the war, have yet to receive any attention. In addition,
appointments to federal positions have favored Yorubas to the neglect and
disadvantage of other ethnic groups, particularly Igbos. All the finance-related
positions in the national govemment are held completely and exclusively by
Yorubas from the President's ethnic group.256 The exclusion contradicts the
pledge Obasanjo gave before taking office in 1999 to ensure that every
individual and group in the nation gets 'justice and equity in a country they can
truly call their own,"257 and it negates the belief one biography said he
expressed many years ago that "he did not fight the [Biafra] war to reduce the
Igbos to serfs in Nigeria. ' 258 Most important, the exclusion is unconstitutional
in that it violates the Federal Character Doctrine mandating that the President
take into account the federal (or ethnic) nature of the country in composing his
government. As the Ogoni uprising teaches, neglect of a minority group can
cause the government problems, much more with an major ethnic group like
Igbos, which makes up one-quarter or more of the country's population.259 So,
constitutional concerns apart, neglect of the Igbos does not show shrewd
political skills on the part of General Obasanjo and he comes up for major
blame in the secessionist movement among the Igbos that is bringing his
government the present headache that it does not need.
As indicated earlier, every recent leader of the country has violated this
"federal character" principle;260 therefore, Obasanjo is not different in this
256. Yusuf Ozi-Usman, Obasanjo's Appointment of Auditor-General Raises Dust,
WEEKLY TRUST (ABUJA), July 5, 2002 (on file with author) (stating that in addition to the
Auditor-General, the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Accountant-General
of the Federation, Minister of State for Finance, and the Director-General of the Debt
Management Office are all Yorubas).
257. Obasanjo, supra note 154, at 20.
258. OJo, supra note 102, at 154. Reinforcing the notion of Igbo marginalization, this
statement took place in the context of a reluctance by the Rivers State government in returning
Igbo property in the State, especially in Port Harcourt, declared "abandoned property" when their
Igbo owners fled for their lives, leaving these belongings during the war. Obasanjo was said to
have been "particularly distressed" by the Rivers State government's handling of the issue.
259. Censuses are a sensitive business in Nigeria and no reliable headcount of any
of the country's numerous ethnic groups exist, but estimates of Igbo population within
the country alone (not including those in the Diaspora) range from twenty-five to forty
million. See IGBOKWE, supra note 251, at 1 (putting the figure at "some 25 million
people which constitutes almost a quarter of the Nigerian population").
260. See discussion supra note 48.
respect. However, what is so puzzling or ironic in General Obasanjo's case is
that as military ruler, his government wrote the 1979 Constitution that
introduced this principle. The purpose of the Federal Character Doctrine,
looking at the language of Section 14(3) is to promote national unity and
command national loyalty. There is no guarantee that complying with the
principle will bring unity, but non-adherence with the principle guarantees
that there will be no unity.
The appropriate response to the threats of secession the Obasanjo
government faces should have been "to seek to address the problems of
marginalization, corruption, and failed federalism that bedevil" the country.2 6'
Rather than dissipate energy suppressing advocacy and dissent, the
government should have sought urgently to "redress the injustices unleashed
on various sections of the country, especially the marginalization of' Igbos.
262
The ideal expectation for the government should be that no ethnic group is
pushed to desperate extremes where secessionism becomes an attractive
263option. As one human rights NGO advised, "[i]f sincere efforts are made
to address these problems, groups such as MASSOB will fizzle out, no matter
how romantic their ideals may seem.' ' 264 Instead, the Obasanjo government
has posited that national unity is not a negotiable proposition265 and it assumes
266the unity and integrity of the country as something automatic. 66 Even with
these glaring centrifugal pulls, the President insists that there is no danger of
the country breaking up. "Today, no serious-minded Nigeria is talking of
breaking Nigeria up. Nigerians today have hope, and when you have hope,
you have a lot. Nigerians today feel that they can get justice. "267
4. Military Reprisals at Odi and Benue State
Odi is the name of a town of about 15,000 people in the Niger Delta
that a contingent of soldiers from the Nigerian army razed to the
ground in November 1999.268 The government deployed about 2000
troops who came in more than twenty vehicles, including several
armored personnel carriers (APCs) mounted with machine guns.269
About 300 soldiers engaged in the actual operation 27°-an orgy of
261. CRP, supra note 239.
262. Dike, supra note 163.
263. Abati, supra note 247.
264. CRP, supra note 239.
265. Aka, supra note 65, at 253.
266. Tayo Oke, Why Obasanjo Must Succeed: Why He Cannot, THENEWS (LAGOS),
Feb. 7, 2000, at 49.
267. Talking Point, supra note 130, at 7.
268. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 144, at 1.
269. Id. at 5.
270. Id.
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destruction that went on for ten whole days. 27 1 According to Human
Rights Watch, barring a bank, a church, and a health center, "It]he
troops demolished every single building . . . and may have killed
hundreds of unarmed civilians. 272 The government's account was that
only forty-three people died, eight of them soldiers.273 The soldiers
were sent in following the killing of twelve policemen by an armed
gang of young men from Odi.274  The gang who killed the twelve
policemen had "no apparent political agenda," but acted "against a
rising clamor from those living in the oil producing areas for a greater
share of the oil wealth.2 75 President Obasanjo visited the town about
four months after it was razed down and described what happened
there as "a tragedy", but blamed the community for failing to act
earlier against the criminal gang.276  The initial response of the
government, presented by the President's special advisor on media and
publicity, was to state "categorically" that no "internationally acceptable
human rights provisions as practiced elsewhere in the developed
world" have been violated, and that the operation was a "carefully
planned and cautiously executed exercise to rid the society" of
criminals.277  But it beats anybody how an operation of this high
magnitude of destructiveness in which, by the government's own
admission, thirty-five unarmed civilians died, can be still called
"carefully planned and cautiously executed." Human Rights Watch called
the operation "the single most serious incident in which extrajudicial
executions were carried out by the Nigerian armed forces since the
government of President Obasanjo came to power in May 1999.,,278
271. Id. at 6.
272. Id. at 1. A Senate delegation on a tour to inspect the damage done to the city
lacked words to describe the damage, managing only to comment that, "The facts speak
for themselves. No need for speech as there is nobody to speak with." Id. at 7 (quoting
then Senate President Chuba Okadigbo).
273. Id. at 6.
274. Id. at 1, 4. Odi Leaders to Sue Government for Military Invasion, VANGUARD
(LAGOS), Nov. 18, 2001 (on file with author). As Human Rights Watch puts it in another report,
the soldiers "killed hundreds of civilians, perhaps as many as 2,000." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
NIGERIA: MILIrARY REVENGE IN BENUE: A POPULATION UNDER ATrACK 3 (Apr. 2002).
275. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 274, at 1.
276. Odi Leaders to Sue Government for Military Invasion, supra note 274.
277. Id. at 5. ("I wish to make it categorically clear that government, by this act, has not
violated any internationally acceptable human rights provisions as practiced elsewhere in the
developed world .... How can it be said that a carefully planned and cautiously executed
exercise to rid the society of these criminals is a violation of human rights?" Id.).
278. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 274, at 3.
In Benue State, located in the middle belt region of the country,
Nigerian soldiers numbering about 200-300, in October 2001, carried
out a military operation targeted at seven towns and villages.279 The
operation lasted three days and, like in Odi, the soldiers used military
vehicles that include several armored tanks.2 80 More than 200 and
probably up to 300 people died, and the soldiers destroyed homes,
shops, public buildings, and other property in seven or so towns and
villages involved. 28' The operation was in response to the abduction
and killing of nineteen soldiers on a mission to restore peace in the
area affected by the conflict between two ethnic groups, Tivs and
Jukuns.282 The mutilated bodies of the soldiers were found on October
12, 2001, in the grounds of a primary school in Zaki-Biam, one of the
seven communities involved.283 So this was an operation that took
place within the context of the broader, long-standing inter-communal
conflict in the area.284 The operation was a carefully coordinated one
designed to take local residents by surprise; eye witnesses reported that
the soldiers pretended they had come to discuss peace, but instead,
turned against those they found in the communities. 285 The soldiers
began their killing spree while the President, the Minister of Defense,
and the Chief of Army Staff were all attending the soldiers' funeral in
the federal capital Abuja.286
The government quickly and strongly condemned the killing of the
soldiers,287 but greeted the news of the military reprisals first with
silence before the President, forced by growing pressure by the media,
288responded that the soldiers might have acted in self-defense.   He
defended that such action was to be expected from the military.289 But
as Human Rights Watch noted in its report on the attacks, the President's
response bore no relation to the gravity of the attacks. 290 The first real
government condemnation of the soldiers' actions came from the Vice
President following a visit to some of the afflicted communities. He
stated: "Two wrongs do not make a right. . . .Unfortunately, things
went out of hand and today we have to manage two wrongs.,29'
279. See id. at 6.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 6-13. See also id. at 13-18.
282. Id. at 5.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 6.





291. Id. at 19.
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The President has admitted that he ordered the killings, but defended that he
did so to "save lives and property." 292  This admission compelled on the
president by the exigency of an impeachment threat by the National Assembly
contradicts the government's position on at least one of these reprisal attacks.
Taking Odi for example, the government denied that it ordered any military
action. All it did, it said, was deploy troops to the area "under the control of the
state governor.., to avert a total breakdown of law and order.' 293 What make
the killings in Benue so difficult to fathom were that (1) it did not have to occur
after Odi294 and (2) the President still used force without legislative consent,
even though after Odi the House of Representatives passed a resolution
requesting the president to first obtain National Assembly consent before
deploying troops to quell any civil unrest in the country. 295 His defense, after
the fact, that he did not need legislative approval to use troops is unpersuasive.
No government-supported independent investigation of these unlawful reprisals
took place and no military personnel engaged in these atrocities were ever
prosecuted.296 Rather than hold them accountable, the government reportedly
promoted some of these soldiers.297 In doing so, as Human Rights Watch
correctly points out, the President effectively created an environment that
encourages perpetration of human rights violations.298
C. International Response to Obasanjo's Human Rights Abuses
Domestic and international human rights NGOs have openly criticized
General Obasanjo's human rights records.299 The criticisms include ones
292. Obasanjo Under Fire, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, Sept. 12, 2002 (on file with
author); Gilbert da Costa, Nigerian Leader Admits Missions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 12, 2002
(on file with author); Lawmakers Say President Ordered Killings, CHI. TRB., Sept. 5, 2002, at 6.
293. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 144, at 6.
294. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 274, at 3. ("When news broke of the
killings of the nineteen soldiers in Benue.. ., many Nigerians feared, and warned, that
'this could be another Odi. Tragically, their predictions came true." Id.).
295. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 144, at 7-8; INTER CHURCH COALITION ON
AFRICA, supra note 149, at 16.
296. Id. at 5; U.S. DEPT OF STATE, supra note 135, at 5.
297. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, supra note 135, at 5.
298. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 5.
299. Domestic human rights NGOs that have criticized the government's human
rights records include the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP) and the Rights of Prisoners
(ROP). The CRP publishes a human rights column that appears every Tuesday in the
Lagos-based daily, The Guardian. Publications in the newspaper the group has released
criticizing the Obasanjo administration's human rights records include: Police Brutalities
on MASSOB, Feb. 13, 2001 (condemning unprovoked violence by security forces on a
movement agitating for the establishment of an independent state in eastern Nigeria using
for atrocities committed by Nigerian peacekeepers abroad. 300 However, to
the dismay of these NGOs, no similar open criticism has come from the
United States and other western countries that not only have specifically
refrained from criticizing the Nigerian government publicly but have also
continued to conduct diplomatic dealings with the regime business as
usual. General Obasanjo visited the United States for talks with President
Bush and other U.S. government officials one week after the killings in
Benue. The visit provided a unique opportunity for the U.S. government
to raise the human rights violation issue forcefully. However, to the
contrary, "U.S. officials did not express concern publicly about the
killings in Benue, and their meetings with President Obasanjo were
dominated by discussions about measures to fight terrorism.
' 3°1
Two explanations may be hazarded for this state of affairs. First, these
countries appear to consider any kind of democracy, even a non-human
rights protective one like Obasanjo's, better than military rule. This point
is elaborated in Part V.A. of this Article. Another explanation, already
adverted to, is the global war on terrorism emanating from the United
States. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the focus in the
United States has been on the war on terrorism as an issue of both
domestic and foreign policies. The campaign appears to leave the Bush
peaceful, nonviolent means); Sad Reminders, Mar. 21, 2001 (condemning human rights
abuses by security forces in Odi in the Niger Delta); First Term Failures!, Mar. 13, 2001
(enumerating a list of human rights businesses, among them governmental corruption);
Transparency and Naira Value, May 15, 2001 (same); Two Years of Obasanjo and Prison
Conditions, May 28, 2001 (lamenting the syndrome of detention without trial in prisons
across the nation). For a sampling of ROP criticism see Nwabueze Okonkwo, Group Tasks
Obasanjo on Awaiting Trial Syndrome, THISDAY (LAGOS), Mar. 28, 2002 (putting the
number of detainees awaiting trial in Nigerian prisons at "well over 50,000").
Human Rights Watch is among the international human rights NGOs that have criticized
the Obasanjo government's human rights records. See, e.g., Dan Isaacs, Rights Group
Slams Nigeria Over Killings, BBC, April 1, 2002, available at http://www.allafrica.com
(last visited Jan. 19, 2003) (condemning the reprisal killings in Benue State); Appolonia
Emeanua, Jos Crisis: Group Urges Obasanjo to Make Findings Public, THISDAY (LAGOS),
Dec. 17, 2001 (on file with author) (berating the government for failing to prevent another
mass killing of about 2000 people by security forces); Human Rights Watch Writes to
President Obasanjo over Massacres, UN INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Apr.
19, 2002, available at http://www.hrw.orglpress/2002/ok??nigeriaorl 8.ltr.htm (last visited
Jan. 13, 2003); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 274; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
MILITARY MASSACRES UNPUNISHED: OBASANJO'S HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS CALLED INTO
QUESTION, April 1, 2002 (on file with author); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NIGERIA: HOLD
MILITARY TO ACCOUNT, Nov. 1, 2002 (on file with author).
300. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NIGERIA: MILITARY MUST ACCOUNT FOR ABUSES,
MAY 11, 2001 (on file with author). See also supra note 172 and accompanying text.
301. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 274, at 2. The closest to a public
condemnation of the killings in Benue was a press statement the U.S. embassy in Abuja
issued on Nov. 9, 2001, urging the Obasanjo administration to conduct an "impartial and
transparent" investigation into the killings and unrest, and to bring to justice those
responsible for the killing of Nigerian soldiers and civilians. Id. at 21.
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administration little political energy for human rights pursuits. 'The new
element in determining American foreign policy is what assets-bases,
intelligence, and diplomatic leverage-it can bring to bear against Al-
Qaeda." 302 Worse still, as one American analyst warns, the campaign
threatens to lead to a permanent demotion of human rights "in the
hierarchy of America's foreign policy priorities.' 30 3 Some scholars have
begun correctly to equate the effect of the Bush government-led war on
terrorism on international relations to the atmosphere that prevailed during
304the just ended cold war.
Reinforcing the Bush administration's overweening attentiveness to
the war against terrorism and with direct consequence for Nigeria are
recent American plans to establish a military base in Sao Tome and
Principe, said to be within hailing distance of Nigeria's new capital,
Abuja.3°5  Meanwhile, without explicitly criticizing his government,
western leaders appear to be distancing themselves from the Obasanjo
government 306 and his policies have come up for critical comment in
influential western media. 30 7 For his part, General Obasanjo has
expressed dissatisfaction with the low level of western support for
302. Michael Ignatieff, Foreign Policy Reconsidered, in PERSPECTIVES ON
TERRORISM: How 9/11 CHANGED U.S. POLITICS 105 (Allan J. Cigler ed., 2002). Al-
Qaeda, spelled variantly as al-Qaida and al-kada, is a terrorist organization supported by
the Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden, that in the past has its basis of operation in
Afghanistan. The organization went underground or moved its headquarters to
somewhere else following the defeat of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and its
replacement by the present interim government friendly to the United States and
supportive of U.S. interests in the region.
303. Id. at 104-05. Professor Ignatieff correctly points out that although the global
human rights movement "does not have its headquarters in Washington[,] ... if
Washington turns away, the movement loses the one government whose power can be
decisive in stopping human rights abuses." Id. at 104.
304. See id. at 105. ("The intellectual and political climate of a war on terror now
resembles the atmosphere of the cold war." Id.). Professor Ignatieff says human rights are
the "the best guarantor" of U.S. national security, adding that "[a]s the cold war should
have taught us, cozying up to friendly authoritarians is a poor bet in the long term." Id.
305. Gerald Home, U.S. and West Africa, PEOPLE'S WEEKLY WORLD NEWSPAPER,
Oct. 19, 2002 (on file with author).
306. See As the Nation Bleeds, THISDAY ONLINE (LAGOS), Aug. 6, 2002, available
at http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2002/08/06/20020806ediOl.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2003) (describing the poor diplomatic reception "not dignifying for the leader of
the most populous country in Africa" the President received from Secretary of State
Colin Powell during an uninvited visit to the United States, his ninth in three years).
307. For example, the New York Times, in a recent editorial, stated that the general's
carriage and the record of his domestic performance three years into his term leave the
roots of democracy still "shallow" in the country. See Troubled Times in Nigeria, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2002, at A14.
Nigerian democratization, 308 and he has recently begun to advocate for a
different developmental model for Africa. 30 9 The General is not known
to tolerate criticism well. 310
D. Recapitulation
General Obasanjo came into office in May 1999 with a mandate for
change to stabilize Nigeria's political and economic system. 311 The
president duly accepted the challenge, promising the country a genuine
renaissance 312 that he has, however, yet to deliver in numerous fields
with ramifications for human rights in the several years since he took
office. No meaningful political change has taken place nor has the
country's crisis of economic decline been addressed with the attention it
deserves. The President's middling performance must be frustrating and
indeed humbling for a person like him who, as a private citizen, spared
no time in criticizing African leaders for their political misdeeds.
313
308. See discussion infra note 344. See also Madu Onuorah, Obasanjo Rejects
Western Standards for Africa, GUARDIAN ONLINE (LAGOS), Mar. 26, 2002 (on file with
author) (castigating "the West for setting unattainable standards for African countries under
minimal assistance" and decrying that the West should threaten to withdraw developmental
aid any time it is not satisfied with the conduct or direction of any African state). With
respect to Nigeria's external debt, which the President repeatedly but unsuccessfully argued
for the West to forgive, Obasanjo maintains that the country was paying back debts that
"had been repaid two times over" and that most of the debt, estimated at about $30 billion,
accrued from "accumulated interests and punitive charges." Id.
309. See Robin Wright, Olusegun Obasanjo: Nigerian Survivor, L.A. TIMES, June
3, 2001, at M3 (maintaining that Africa must find its own model of development rather
than "ape the development model of the rest of the world"); Onuorah, supra note 308
(arguing that "Africa should be free to evolve and enforce its own standards for good
governance and human rights"). The separate development model the President
advocates is one that, according to him, must take care of such essentials of life, "things
that make a substantial difference" like health, education, labor saving devices that
enable farmers to increase production, electricity, and roads from village to markets. Id.
310. Ojo, supra note 102, at 154 (commenting that Obasanjo is a man "incapable of
handling criticisms, and tended to respond rather aggressively to them").
311. See, e.g., Mundt & Aborisade, supra note 76, at 728 (stating the hope of the
nation that General Obasanjo will be able "to prevent further destruction of the economy
and begin the long process of turning the country around"); Dan Isaac, Nigeria's
Turbulent Prospects, BBC Jan. 11, 2002 (on file with author). ("[I]t was hoped that a
civilian government ... would bring greater social stability and a platform for sustained
economic growth." Id.).
312. Obasanjo, supra note 154, at 20.
313. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Also, in 1994, while contributing
to a debate on a constitutional future for the country, General Obasanjo charged that,
"Nigeria is a country perpetually potentially great, almost permanently in crisis,
regularly threatened with disintegration, prolongingly devoid of democracy, and
economically plundered and mismanaged, forever talking about democracy but retreating
from democracy." The Kaduna Caucus, WEST AFRICA (LONDON), Feb. 14-20, 1994, at
252. It is interesting that less than one year to the end of one full term in office as
civilian president, most of these features still remain. Finally, in an "African leadership"
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Beginning with political change, there are two aspects to the problem,
namely: the quality of the country's democracy or civilian rule and
political restructuring. We will deal with the first aspect here and save
the second for the next part of the Article focusing on that topic. We
have argued that Nigeria since May 1999 is a transitional regime that
does not rise to the level of a democracy, one reason why we choose to
designate the country's present experimentation as civil(ian) rule rather
than any democracy.314 To make matters worse, given the high degree
of military presence in the government, even the civilian character of the
government is suspect or questionable. The demilitarization expected
for the Fourth Republic has yet to take place.31 5 Rather, the legacy of
military rule remains very strong in the land. The political system
remains unweaned from the suffocating legacies of former military
dictators, three of whom-Buhari, Babangida, and Abubakar-are still
very much around and unabashedly parade their influences. All three
were summoned but none of them answered the subpoena to appear
before the Oputa Panel.31 6  The President, the Director of National
Security, the Defense Minister, and the Director of the State Security
Service (national intelligence) are all retired military persons.317 Last
but not least, lawmakers who are supposed to oversee the executive and
ensure the proper enthronement of democracy are all either Abacha,
Abubakar, or Babangida boys.318 Because of this large military presence
in the government or in spite of it, the President relies heavily on the
army to contain ethnic and religious violence and to even patrol the
conference he hosted in his farm at Ota in 1988, General Obasanjo lambasted African
leaders for excessive attention to political issues and their insipidness with respect to
economic issues. "When African leaders talk among themselves they fire the
imagination and really applaud on political matters," he said. "But when it comes to
economic issues ... [these leaders] are not nearly as enthusiastic as they are about
political issues." Philip C. Aka, Leadership in African Development, 14 J. THIRD
WORLD STUD. 213, 229 (1997). General Obasanjo is not good at taking his own counsel
given that, as president, he has also excessively "applaud[ed] on political matters," to the
near-neglect of economic issues.
314. See discussion infra Part V.A.
315. Joseph, supra note 76, at 49. ("Demilitarization of the Nigerian polity is one
of the most important and difficult exercises the Obasanjo administration must perform
for the nation. This project has to be thorough, comprehensive, and even radical in
conception." Id.).
316. Oshunkeye, supra note 57, at 31-35.
317. John Chiahemen, Nigerian Democracy Wobbles, Army's Profile Rises,
REUTERS, Oct. 29, 2001 (on file with author).
318. Id.
streets.319  Also, many Nigerian cities have come under military-
enforced curfews. 320  Professor Oladimeji Aborisade rationalized that
General Obasanjo "has created an administration that is effectively a
military-civilian dyarchy .... ,,321 Assuming one calls his administration
a dyarchy, it is a dyarchy with a strong military accent. In addition to
this lack of a strong civilian presence in a supposedly civilian
government, since taking office General Obasanjo has failed to adjust
his leadership style to the tenets and imperatives of democratic rule, and
he has a frosty relationship with the National Assembly, 322 which in the
least does not help the growth of democracy. The President is a
legendarily stubborn individual with a cantankerous personality, 323 who
takes advice from no one.324 These multiplying anti-democratic features
belie General Obasanjo's contestation that Nigerian "democracy is
working" 325 and contradicts his argument that he has done well enough
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. ABORISADE& MUNDT, supra note 69, at 247.
322. See, e.g., Oma Djebah, Presidency Set to Deal with Anyim, THISDAY (LAGOS),
July 1, 2002 (on file with author). Pius Anyim is the president of the Nigerian senate,
the third since May 1999. Two previous senate presidents were removed at the
instigation of General Obasanjo because he found them too independent to control or get
around. A similar disharmonious tenor characterizes his relationship with the House of
Representatives. Recently, the Speaker of the House of Representatives accused him of
running a dictatorship, even going as far as likening him to Adolf Hitler! See Obasanjo
is Running a Dictatorship, THISDAY SUNDAY (LAGOS), Aug. 18, 2002 (on file with
author). The latest in the ever-deteriorating relationship between the President and the
National Assembly was a call by the House of Representatives for the President to resign
or face impeachment. It backed its call with an elaborate list of constitutional violations
against the President, including an alleged tendency to spend money without legislative
appropriation or to spend appropriated money in a manner not mandated by the
legislature. When the President responded with an address to the nation in which he
dismissed the ultimatum as a "joke gone too far", the Senate supported their colleagues
in the House, making the ultimatum to resign or be impeached a joint one by the whole
National Assembly. For a sample of the many news-stories on this latest breaking story
on the evolution of Nigerian democracy see, e.g., da Costa, supra note 292; Ali et al.,
supra note 9; Steve Nwosu, A Presidency in Crisis, THISDAY (LAGOS), Aug. 17, 2002
(on file with author); Rotimi Ajayi & Emmanuel Aziken, Reps Give Obasanjo Two
Weeks to Resign, VANGUARD (LAGOS), Aug. 14, 2002 (on file with author); Chiahemen,
supra note 158. Not surprising, the dispute with the National Assembly overshadows
much of the President's recent action and activities, including his address to the nation
on October 1, 2002, to mark the 42nd anniversary of the country's independence.
323. IBB on OBJ, supra note 165. ("Obasanjo has been a very quarrelsome
President. He has quarreled with his Vice President, with the Presidents of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the National Chairmen of his political
party, some governors of the states and almost every single important stakeholder in his
Party . I..." ld.).
324. Abati, supra note 142. ("You have a legion of advisers but they are quick to
tell whomever cares to listen that you don't take any advice . . . . [I]t is dangerous to
have a president who does not listen to any one." Id.).
325. See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 95, at 13.
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to deserve another term in office.326 On a visit recently to Nigeria,
former U.S. president William J. Clinton counseled Nigerians about the
need for compromise and concessions in democracy, given that "no one
is all-wise, all-knowing or has all the truth. ' 32 7 He said that "governance
is about using your power for a while to uplift the fortunes of the people
and it requires compromising with your adversaries. No victory or
defeat is ever final. '328 These are good counsel the President can use.
The matter of the relationship between economic development and
human rights is addressed in Part V.B. of the Article. We therefore
address here more generalized issues not covered in that section. There
are five aspects to the discussion here. The first is the need to diversify
the economy beyond its present heavy dependence on oil. "Nigeria
cannot depend on oil forever. To prosper in the long term, it must learn
how to create wealth, rather than simply extracting it from the soil.
329
This is because income from oil fluctuates whereas what the country
needs is growth that comes "from steady investment in higher
productivity, which can last and sustain itself. '330 Nigeria is likely to
remain poor and its democracy unstable if it continues to build the
mainstay of its economy heavily on oil.331 But although diversification
of the economy has become very imperative, 332 under General Obasanjo,
the Nigerian government is putting all its economic eggs into the oil (and
natural gas) basket rather than "devis[ing] other ways of making
326. See Talking Point, supra note 130, at 7. The President has long since
announced his candidacy for a second term in the presidential election scheduled for
April 2003. See da Costa, supra note 292; Obasanjo Under Fire, supra note 292.
327. Eddy Odivwri, Solutions to Nigeria's Problems Within, Says Clinton, THISDAY
ONLINE (LAGOS), Sept. 25, 2002, available at http://www.thisdayonline.com/news/
20020925news01.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
328. Id.
329. Robert Guest, Umpteenth Time Lucky, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2000, at 16.
330. Id.
331. Id. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2002: AFRICA
OVERVIEW 4 (2002) (stating that Nigeria will have a hard time creating "a functional
democracy" solely depending on oil); Odivwri, supra note 327 (quoting former U.S.
president William J. Clinton's advice to Nigerians that "modem economy focuses more
on what is in your head and not what is under your feet"). As President Clinton correctly
pointed out, comparing Saudi Arabia, one of the largest oil producers in the world, with
Japan, a non-oil producing nation, oil producing nations are not necessarily wealthy
nations. Japan has a GDP three and a half times that of Saudi Arabia. Id.
332. Philip C. Aka, Education, Economic Development, and Return to Democratic
Politics in Nigeria, 18 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 21, 22 (2001). ("Concern in the country for a
long time now, including since the return to democratic rule... has centered around how to
diversify the economy away from its prolonged heavy dependence on crude oil." Id.).
money." '333 Second, there is still suffocating government control over
the economy or what one scholar called economic statism, 334 an
occurrence that reinforces governmental corruption,335 among other
evils. Although separate, points one and two are interconnected to the
point of being inextricable. Nigeria needs to develop, "for the first time,
a basis of production and accumulation outside of oil and outside the
state ' 336 that, unfortunately, has not happened under General Obasanjo.
Third, provision of basic infrastructure and amenities such as electricity,
clean water, and good roads necessary for the efficient and effective
operation of the economy is still lacking. 337 Fourth, income equality or
333. Guest, supra note 329, at 16. In a subdued address to the nation commemorating
the country's 42nd independence anniversary, the President claimed that he had expanded the
base of the economy. Yet, although he made fleeting reference to agriculture and industry, the
exclusive dependence on crude oil export was still obvious. He was "pleased to report" an
increase in the nation's proven oil reserves from "about 25 to almost 32 billion barrels of oil.
We have also increased the oil production capacity from about 2.4 million to about 3 million
barrels per day." Even his search for "foreign investment", for which he has made numerous
trips abroad, revolved around the same oil sector. He foresees a production of 4-5 million
barrels of oil per day by 2005-and an "improvement of [national] government earnings by
over 50 percent"-with inflow of foreign capital. Obasanjo, supra note 185. The problem
with this remark is that it is an overly rosy projection that does not take into account
fluctuations in oil prices nor the additional negative environmental damage from increased oil
exploration on oil-producing areas, assuming oil reserves are non-depletable, but which they
are not. The country's multiplying economic problems question General Obasanjo's
optimism that Nigeria can "become a semi-industrialized country by the end of this
decade." Cobb & Kramer, supra note 95, at 13.
334. See Diamond, supra note 9, at 82-85 (discussing reorganization of state-
society relationship). Most of the opposition in the country to relinquishment of
governmental control of the economy comes from the northern establishment, "which
fears that wholesale privatization would deliver the economy into the hands of the much
larger, richer, and better organized Southern bourgeoisie." Id. at 84. See also Guest,
supra note 66, at 15. ("Northern elites feared that they would lose in an unrestricted
commercial contest, so they used the state to restrict the operation of market capitalism."
Id.). Note that, as Diamond, supra note 9, at 85, reminds us, advocacy of reduced
government interference in the economy does not mean advocacy of complete state
withdrawal from the economy. Rather, as Professor Joseph says, Nigeria actually needs
a "viable state" that is not eroded by the "excesses of prebendalism" (complete disregard
for legal rules and procedures). Joseph, supra note 76, at 49.
335. Robert Guest, The Stony Road to Reform, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2000, at 7.
However, the Economist believes Nigeria will still be poor even if its wealth were not
wasted away through governmental corruption. Guest, supra note 329, at 16. But cf.
Joseph, supra note 76, at 50. ("A sharp reduction in the funds stolen from the country's
annual earnings, the dramatic reduction in lavish projects undertaken solely as a means
of siphoning wealth, and the conversion of the billions stashed abroad into invisible
capital at home.., would give an immense boost to the Nigerian economy." Id.).
336. Diamond, supra note 9, at 85.
337. In his speech to the nation to mark the 42nd independence anniversary of the
country, the President gave his latest update on steps his government is taking to ensure there
is no power blackout in the country. Obasanjo, supra note 185. However, it is hard to
understand why governments in Nigeria, including civilian ones like Obasanjo's, many
decades after independence have difficulty rendering to the citizens a service as basic as
generation of enough power for domestic and economic activities in the entire country.
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the gap between rich and poor in the country is widening rather than
narrowing. The incipient middle class has dimirnished to the point of
extinction. During his address to the nation on the occasion of the
country's forty-second anniversary on October 1, 2002, the President
disclosed that twenty percent of Nigerians control fifty-six percent of the
wealth of the country; eighty percent controls the other forty-four
percent.338 Nigerian statistics are notoriously unreliable, and anecdotal
evidence will uncover a gap greater than this, but at least one gets the
picture. One aspect to the gap often overlooked by analysis such as the
President's is the economic gap among ethnic groups. Inconsistent and
inequitable application of "unity" doctrines such as the Federal
Character Principle can lead to disparities among ethnic groups in the
distribution of national resources that can create tension or conflict in the
body politic. 339 Fifth and finally, economic bad news result in a deficit
in socioeconomic rights that in turn produce negative spillover effects on
political-civil and solidarity (or group) rights. No wonder that, in the
area of solidarity rights, ethnic "bicker[ing] over the division of the oil
spoils" '340 in the country has grown, not abated, as the economic pies
decrease under General Obasanjo.
What is so tragic about the President's middling performance report
card is that, for all the difficult legacies coming from long army rule, it
did not have to be for somebody with Obasanjo's skills, leadership
experience, and understanding of the Nigerian condition having been
president before in a military setting. To whom much is given, much is
expected. Obasanjo is the only individual in Nigerian post-colonial
history privileged to serve the country in both military and civilian
338. Obasanjo, supra note 185.
339. Conflict can arise sometimes when through the witting or unwitting action of
the government, an ethnic group that is the victim of inequitable treatment realizes the
true extent of its exploitation. For example, the escalation of violence in the Niger Delta
intensified after residents of the area, along with other Nigerians, were bused to a rally
military strongman General Abacha, hell-bent on legitimizing his military rule into a
civilian one, orchestrated. According to one report,
For youths from the Niger delta who took part in this extravaganza, the sight of
Nigeria's capital was a revelation. They goggled at the smooth roads, the
gleaming hotels and the splendid houses that oil money had brought for their
rulers. They noted that whereas the delta has thousands of rivers but almost no
bridges, Abuja has hundreds of bridges but no rivers to speak of. They
realized for the first time how badly they had been robbed, and have nursed an
implacable sense of grievance ever since.
Robert Guest, Oil Alone Doesn't Make You Happy, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2000, at 9.
340. Guest, supra note 329, at 16.
capacities. 341 By the time his term lapses in 2003, he would have
governed the country for almost eight years-four years as civilian
president and three and two-thirds years as military head of state. This is
equivalent to two terms in office for a U.S. president and close to one-fifth
of the entire time the country had been independent. Could the President
therefore justifiably insulate himself from all the sins and troubles
associated with previous leadership in the country commentators complain
about? 34 2 General Obasanjo thoroughly enjoys the ceremonial trappings
of the job, but has neither the patience nor appetite for the mundane grub
of everyday governance. He traveled out of the country ninety-three times
for a total of 340 days over three years in office, causing some critics to
label him "the absentee president of Nigeria."343 Obasanjo has such love
for foreign travels that he continues to engage in them even though he
himself concedes these expensive foreign trips for an increasingly poor
country, undertaken supposedly in search of western support for the
Nigerian economy, have yielded the country little economic returns.
This indulgence in unwarranted profligacy contrasts sharply with General
Obasanjo's touted image as a frugal person and his "low profile"
orientation as a military head of state.345 The President does not like to be
compared with previous Nigerian leaders (he seems to believe he is better
than all of them, particularly the military ones),346 but still commits
himself to tired policies of the past that brought the country to its present
deplorable condition. 347  Due to this less-than-average performance in
office, less than one year to the end of his term in office, General
Obasanjo now finds himself in the awkward position of a leader feted
abroad but criticized by his people at home.348
341. Tobs Agbaegbu, Two Times Lucky, NEWSWATCH (LAGOS), Mar. 15, 1999, at 9-18.
342. See, e.g., ACHEBE, supra note 251.
343. See As the Nation Bleeds, supra note 306. The only other world leader who
comes close to this record is His Holiness Pope John Paul 11, who is said to have traveled
abroad ninety-one times in, but note this, the twenty-four years he has been papal leader. Id.
344. See William Wallis, Survey-Nigeria, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 9,
2002 (An interview the President gave to the London Financial Times where he
conveyed: "In three years I went round the world and I didn't get anything. From April
1999, 1 went round the countries in Europe, twice over, I went to Japan to America to
Canada and I got good words .... [But] [n]o action at all." Id.).
345. OSAGHAE, supra note 66, at 98. Note, however, as earlier indicated, in supra
notes 117-19 and accompanying text, that the low-profile orientation was something
induced then by the dwindling fortunes of the Nigerian economy. The state of the economy
today necessitates but, unfortunately, does not get a similar low-profile orientation.
346. See Wright, supra note 309.
347. For example, under his administration, prestige projects of dubious economic
utility or value, associated with the ancien rggime, still goes on. The President budgeted
$330 million for a national soccer stadium in Abuja, more money than the government
spends on either health or education. He has also spent tens of millions of dollars on
aircraft for himself. Id.
348. Lawmakers Say President Ordered Killings, supra note 292.
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V. UNDERSTANDING THE PARADOX: TOWARD AN EXPLANATION
Four explanations of the paradox between civil rule and human rights
violations in Nigeria since 1999 that we explore in this section are (1)
the relationship between human rights and democracy, (2) the
relationship between human rights and economic development, (3) the
relationship between human rights and political restructuring, and (4) the
complementarity of individual and collective rights or inter-relationship
between these two categories of rights. These explanations illustrate
rather than exhaust all the possibilities.
A. Human Rights and Democracy
A relationship exists between human rights and democracy. Prospects for
human rights are better under a democratic setup than under authoritarian
military rule or any other type of dictatorship. Democracy forms the
bedrock for any serious talk about human rights protection or promotion.
349
Without that foundation, any talk about human rights is unserious or
meaningless, given, as the experience of Nigeria from 1983 to 1999 well
exemplifies, the violation of human rights that occurs in eras of military
rule. Yet the existence of a democracy does not automatically translate into
human rights gains. Democracy can exist uncoupled with human rights.
Some scholars have commented on this strange or ironic possibility.
Jack Donnelly writes that "[d]emocracy and human rights have very
different, and often competing, theoretical and moral foundations."
350
He highlights "[t]he potential conflicts between human rights and
democracy, 351 and maintains that "a procedurally democratic
government may still systematically violate human rights. 352 Fareed
Zakaria has pointed out that the majority of democracies that are
flourishing today in many parts of the world are formal electoral or
procedural democracies not underpinned with constitutional liberalism
and are therefore non-human rights protective.35 3  "Today the two
strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the western political fabric,
are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing;
349. See Aka, supra note 12, at 430-32.
350. DONNELLY, supra note 11, at 154.
351. Id. at 155.
352. Id. at 154.
353. See generally Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, in GLOBALIZATION
AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY 181-82 (Patrick O'Meara et a]. ed., 2000).
constitutional liberalism is not., 354 He calls these democracies "illiberal
democracies" and sharply distinguishes them from liberal democracies,
which are rights-protective. 355  Zakaria maintains that constitutional
liberalism, which he defines as a "bundle of freedoms," such as rule of
law, separation of power, and the protection of basic liberties of speech,
assembly, religion, and property, is "theoretically different and historically
distinct from democracy. ' 35 6  He identifies "a spectrum of illiberal
democracy" from modest offenders to near-tyrannies with countries in
between.357 Illiberal democracies are difficult to handle, he explains,
because they are wrapped in "the mantle of legitimacy," in the sense that
their legitimacy and strength derive from a perception by the international
community that "they are reasonably democratic.,
358
One scholar, Akwasi Aidoo, has for Africa validated some of these
findings, noting that "everywhere" in the democratizing continent, human
rights have "routinely and systematically" been violated, without regard to
whether the country affected is a democracy or not.359 He argues, and of
particular significance for this study, that ".... respect for human rights will
not necessarily issue from current democratization process in Africa unless
human rights are specifically identified as a target in the struggle." 360 Stated
differently, Aidoo argues for liberal, not illiberal, democracies in Africa.
These scholarships give helpful insight into the human rights situation in
Nigeria since May 1999. Zakaria's "spectrum of illiberal democracy" theory
applies to the country. Nigeria under General Obasanjo is a strong testament
that "a procedurally democratic government may still systematically violate
human rights.",36' Also, the rights-protective quality of the country's civil rule
is so low that Nigeria should rank toward the "near-tyrannies" in Zakaria's
spectrum of illiberal democracy.362 In other words, under General Obasanjo
the country is not just an illiberal democracy but a particularly low-quality
one that, as Zakaria would probably view it, mixes an insubstantial "degree of
democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism."3 63  The low right-
protectiveness justifies the designation of the country as simply civil rule as
opposed to any democracy in any sense other than figure of speech. Another
354. Id. at 182.
355. Id. at 181-84.
356. Id. Zakaria quotes Philippe Schmitter approvingly for the position that
liberalism as a political ideology "has never been immutably or unambiguously linked"
to the practice of democracy. Id. at 181.
357. Idat 182.
358. Id. at 193-94.
359. Aidoo, supra note 5, at 707.
360. Id. at 704-05
361. DONNELLY, supra note 11, at 154.
362. Zakaria, supra note 353, at 182.
363. Id. at 182.
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justification reinforcing the deliberate and obvious choice of civilian in place
of democracy or democratic rule is due to our perception of the Obasanjo
regime as still transitional. In his piece surveying the challenges of leadership
Obasanjo confronts upon his assumption of office in 1999, Professor Joseph
rated Nigeria under Obasanjo as only a "a post-authoritarian system with
democratic aspirations."3 " Reference to the Fourth Republic as a democracy,
as we have occasionally done in this Article, is a figure of speech that should
leave nobody under any illusion regarding the transitional character of the
Obasanjo government.365 However, although it is to be perceived as no more
than a transitional government, the Obasanjo administration was also
expected to accomplish a thorough demilitarization of the political system
366
such as would lay the foundation for the evolution of the country within this
new century as an "important nurser[y] of democratic theorizing and
367construction" in Africa or constitutional democracy. This failure represents
the tragedy of human rights and democracy in the country since 1999,
considering that there is no individual more suited to accomplish this
demilitarization, given his past ties to the army establishment, than General
Obasanjo. Zakaria's work also helps us understand why the United States
and other western governments have refrained from criticizing General
Obasanjo's human rights records. So long as they are not downright military
regimes, illiberal democracies like Nigeria under General Obasanjo possess a
mantle of legitimacy from the international community, which views them as
"reasonably democratic" irrespective of how pitifully low the human rights
content of their "democracy" is. Similarly, although it still makes little sense,
we understand why Obasanjo continues to be perceived internationally as the
voice of democracy in Nigeria and Africa, even though he presides over a
"democracy" exceedingly illiberal or low content in human rights.
364. Joseph, supra note 76, at 48. Joseph adds, inter alia, that ... it would be self-
deluding to believe that Nigeria is now a democratic state." Id.
365. Assessing the Nigerian government since 1999 as less than full democracy in
no way belittles the country's political development. This is because, given the option
the country could have faced if power had not been transferred in 1999 (for example,
possible civil war), the label of "a post-authoritarian Nigeria with democratic aspirations"
provided by Professor Joseph is still a significant achievement. Id.
366. See id. at 49. ("Demilitarization of the Nigerian polity is one of the most important
and difficult exercises the Obasanjo administration must perform for the nation. This project
has to be thorough, comprehensive, and even radical in conception." Id.). The logic behind such
demilitarization, Professor Joseph explains, is that Nigeria has seen the military emerge as
"the central political institution in the nation" that an occurrence like "[t]he mere handover of
power from a military general to a retired military general," although important, does not alter. Id.
367. Id.
B. Human Rights and Economic Development
Another possible explanation for the coexistence of civil rule in
Nigeria with human rights violations is that a certain level of economic
prosperity (economic development) is necessary for human rights
progress. No such prosperity, as we have seen, unfortunately, has
occurred in Nigeria. Rather, the decline in the economy that has gone on
"for much of the last three decades," 368 has continued unabated under
General Obasanjo. There are two important senses, one direct, the other
indirect, in which no progress in economic development can spell bad
news for human rights. The first, indirect, is that no progress in
economic development can result in reduced popular attachment to
democracy or non-military rule, the very context necessary for any
human rights promotion to occur. This is the sense most often invoked
in the average discussion on the relationship between human rights and
economic development. General Obasanjo talks repeatedly about the
"dividends of democracy,' 369 even though his government has delivered
little such material dividends. Still under this view, Professors Robert J.
Mundt and Oladimeji Aborisade argued that Nigerians are very
outcome-oriented in their approach to support of democracy. °
Specifically, they said, the attraction of democracy for Nigerians is "its
association with prosperity.
'" 37 1
The second sense, unlike the first, less often talked about, is that
socioeconomic rights (pursued and achieved through economic
development) are an integral part of human rights. Lack of progress in
economic development means a reduction in these rights with possible
negative spillover effect on the two other categories of political-civil
rights and solidarity rights. The relationship is direct because, unlike in
the first sense, it is not filtered in through any intervening variable. One
would think that this relationship, being direct, would be something
more talked about or at least something that gets as much attention
among scholars and politicians as the first. But the reason it is not much
talked about is that, as earlier indicated, socioeconomic (and solidarity)
rights are considered non-real rights, unlike political-civil rights, unfit
368. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 135, at 1. See also OSAGHAE, supra note 66,
at 15 (identifying economic crisis as one of the major themes of post-independence
politics in Nigeria).
369. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 309. ("We adopted democracy not just for the
intrinsic value of democracy, but because our people believe that democracy can
enhance their quality of life . . . . They expect, rightly, a democracy dividend. If that
doesn't come, they will feel disenchanted." Id.).
370. Mundt & Aborisade, supra note 76, at 727. ("Nigerians are more interested in
the outcome of the political process than in the process itself." Id.).
371. id.
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for protection as guaranteed rights in many national constitutions, including
Nigeria's. This unsatisfactory constitutional treatment of socioeconomic (and
solidarity) rights is unfortunate because the human rights concept
embraces all three categories or generations of rights without exception.
One lesson relating to this topic is the complementarity of political-civil
and socioeconomic rights. Performance in both fields is necessary to
solidify rights. Strong performance in the political-civil rights field and
weak performance in the socioeconomic area will not consolidate rights.
The Obasanjo regime finds itself even in a worse situation because political-
civil rights have also not fared well. Some of the conflicts in Nigeria with
severe consequences for human rights have been worsened by economic
difficulties in the country. The message is that Nigeria may have to
reconsider its decision that socioeconomic rights are not justiciable. Making
these rights justiciable may make the government buckle up, although one,
conversely, can also make the argument that governments already doing
little now will find their hands full with additional legal-constitutional
obligations if socioeconomic rights become real rights.
C. Human Rights and Political Restructuring
In addition to a democracy imbued with rights (liberal democracy) and a
certain level of economic prosperity, real restructuring of the political system
is also necessary for human rights to take root in Nigeria. The absence of
that fundamental political restructuring is a third explanation for the paradox
between civil rule and human rights violations in the country since 1999.
Obasanjo came into office promising change, but after over three years in
office, has yet to take restructuring seriously. The imperative of federalism
as the only viable format for organizing Nigeria was recognized as far back
as 1954 when the country was still a British colony.372 Yet, with the
exception of the First Republic (1960-66), the country has been a federal
system that is run in a unitary format.3 73  This anomalous situation was
372. On the eve of a conference leading to the adoption of the 1954 Constitution,
the Colonial Secretary, Lord Chandos, wrote in his diary: "It was clear that Nigeria if it
was to be a nation, must be a federation, with as few subjects reserved for the Central
Government as would preserve national unity." KIRK-GREENE, supra note 66, at 10. See
also GRAF, supra note 67, at 133 (remarking that an important truism of Nigerian politics
is that "the country's continuing existence as a nation-state hinges on its capacity to
evolve and maintain an adequate system of federalism").
373. The military lodged power in the center at the expense of the states out of fear
of the country disintegrating if true federalism is introduced. OSAGHAE, supra note 66,
at 24. The first post-colonial government to introduce the country to a unitary system
expected to be corrected but has not changed under General Obasanjo's
civilian government. The 1999 Constitution inheres centralizing features
inconsistent with federalism. For example, the document provides that
judges of the state high courts are to be selected by a federal body, to be
known as the National Judicial Council, which is also charged with funding
the operation of these state courts. 37 4  In addition, the Obasanjo
administration also operates like a unitary government. The President's
Attorney-General recently chastised states for what he called their "needless
agitation... for more and more freedom so that they may not come under
any kind of supervision whatsoever." 375 He reminded them "that they were
not originally nations which came into the union, each with its own
rights .... Some of them seem to have forgotten who their father is and we
need to remind them that is the Federal Government." 376  The President
himself recently unilaterally increased the revenue allocation to the federal
government to the detriment of the states and local governments.
377
The need for a fundamental reform of the Nigerian political system
had been apparent for long, no perceptive leader could miss it. Professor
Joseph observed that the ethnic challenges Nigeria faces all across the
country is "so systemic in nature that more comprehensive frameworks
for resolving and preventing them must be developed., 378  He also
recommended, quoting one key Nigerian politician, that "a regrouping
of some of Nigeria's 36 states" into "larger entities" was necessary for
"beneficial governance consequences."379  The constitutional drafting
expert Chief Frederick R. A. Williams seems to share the same view.
(for a few short months in 1966) was a military government. The flaw with this logic is
that it could lead precisely to the disintegration the government was trying to avoid. The
argument is even less plausible and more incomprehensible in a civilian regime.
Nigerian unity must be fragile indeed if devolution of powers in what is supposed to be a
federal system could lead to disintegration.
374. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 7.
375. Fred Ohwahwa, Agabi's Unitarist Agenda, GUARDIAN ONLINE (LAGOS), July
28, 2002 (on file with author) (citing the attorney general's paper delivered at a seminar
on "The Ethnic Question").
376. Id. The federal government upbraids the sub-national governments for waste
and mismanagement, but Abuja is also guilty of the very same crimes it levels against
these sub-national governments. With his endless foreign trips, the President has not
proven himself a frugal person and may have set the bad example for travels and
rampant itineraries that the governors seem to follow. What, therefore, the Attorney-
General inveighs against is not the non-transparency and non-accountability of sub-
national functionaries; it is that these non-federal functionaries have failed to account
(or, in Nigerian military parlance, "report") to the federal government.
377. Id.
378. Joseph, supra note 76, at 50.
379. Id. Other structural changes he suggested include fundamental judicial
reforms and the evolution of legislatures at the state and national levels into true
parliaments rather than conduits for "opportunistic gatherings devoted mainly to the
pursuit of appointments and financial payoffs." Id. at 49.
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He believes that the states are too small and not sufficiently large to
cater for the social and economic needs of the people and that "far too
many powers are vested in the federal government., 380 He would want
the states retained as they are now but organized into a group as
federating units such that the new group of states can exercise greater
powers over those matters that affect the lives of the people.38' Adebayo
Williams stated, focusing on the Niger Delta, that if the President
"decides to temporize, hoping that the trouble will go away, he risks not
satisfying anybody and worsening the tension. ' 382 Professors Aborisade
and Mundt, in their joint work on politics in Nigeria, observed that "the
long evolution toward a de facto unitary state" in the country needs to be
reversed, 383 and they contended that the "challenge" for the country "is
to find a constitution imbued with the federalism necessary to allow each
area a high level of autonomy, while at the same time providing for a
distribution of income from the country's natural resources that will give
all areas an incentive for loyalty to national institutions. 384 Finally, the
London Economist in its survey on Nigeria since Obasanjo came into
office, argued that fundamental structuring is the only medicine for
minimizing governmental corruption in Nigeria. "The whole Nigerian
political system, built up in a series of unfortunate steps over the past 40
years, tends to encourage corruption. To curb it, Mr. Obasanjo must
change the system itself. '385 It maintains that Nigeria needs "a government
that enables citizens to thrive, rather than stealing their money and
strangling their businesses with controls."
386
Even before General Abacha's death on June 8, 1998, "it was obvious,"
for example, "that a particular type of military tyranny had exhausted its
historical and political possibilities in Nigeria." '387 The lesson from the over
fifteen years of destructiveness and developmental decay of military rule
that ended in May 1999 was that the nation cannot proceed business as
usual. General Obasanjo himself in the past recognized the need for
restructuring. He made a case for insertion of a clause permitting secession
380. Shola Oshunkeye & Dayo Aiyetan, Oputa Panel is Unnecessary, TELL
(LAGOS), Aug. 27, 2001, at 56 (interview).
381. Id.
382. Williams, supra note 122, at 413.
383. ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 69, at 248.
384. Id.
385. Guest, supra 85, at 6.
386. Guest, supra note 329, at 16.
387. Williams, supra note 122, at 409.
in the Constitution in a book published since he came into office, 388 and, in
1994, as a private citizen, he supported the call for a conference of whatever
name that "will deal comprehensively with the fundamental issues of
Nigerian existence." 389 So why has he not embraced fundamental reforms,
when as Professor Joseph says, all individuals charged with leadership in
the Fourth Republic "are bearers of a great mandate"?
39 °
The only plausible explanation can be that General Obasanjo is an
unabashed "systems man" who does not believe in fundamental or
structural reforms. 39 1  As one perceptive analyst puts it, the President
belongs in the generation of Nigerians that place premium on unity at the
expense of fairness and equity and which sees devolution of powers as
courting "separatism at best and disintegration at worst., 392 The London
Economist says: "President Obasanjo may not yet have embraced radical
reform, but he is clearly trying to change things for the better."'3 93 But how
can the President change things for the better without embracing radical
reforms? Didn't the magazine predict "that the latest government, like its
predecessors, will fail to live up" to any reasonable expectations without
fundamental change-such as the evolution of an economy not solely
dependent upon oil? 394  The irony of Obasanjo's election and second
coming is that the intrigues of leadership recruitment in the country has led
to the choice of a "compromise" candidate 395 who does not believe in
structural reforms precisely at a very time the political fate of the country
hangs on such reforms. These intrigues result in the anomaly for the
country of a President "who is feted internationally but increasingly
388. See generally OLUSEGUN OBASANJO, THIS ANIMAL CALLED MAN (2000).
389. See The Kaduna Caucus, supra note 313, at 252 (General Obasanjo's keynote
address at a workshop on "State of the Nation, Which Way forward?" as part of an
ongoing debate at the time on Nigeria's constitutional future).
390. Joseph, supra note 76, at 48. Professor Joseph describes this great mandate as
one not just derived from the elections of February 1999, but also emanating "from the
historical struggles of our people against authoritarian rule in all its forms since we were
brought under European systems of dominance three or more centuries ago." Id.
391. See OJo, supra note 102, at 29 (Obasanjo "is a man who believes in the system,
and leadership to him means tinkering with the existing structures to evolve a more
dynamic one .... Id.); Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria: Which Way Forward, DAILY TIMES
(LAGOS), Aug. 7, 1985, quoted in THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE 116 (Donald Rothchild &
Naomi Chazan ed., 988). ("... I was by virtue of my training and upbringing what you
might call a systems man. I believe that if a system is good and well-founded, any person
with average ability could make it work .... Id.).
392. Oke, supra note 266, at 49.
393. Guest, supra note 329, at 16.
394. Id.
395. See, e.g., Akpo Esajere, Obasanjo Reveals Northern Agenda on Power Shift,
GUARDIAN ONLINE (LAGOS), Sept. 29, 2002 (on file with author) (disclosing a pact
between so-called northern elders and politicians within the President's own political
party and presidential candidates in February 1999 in which the Northerners agreed to
"allocate power to the South" in return for key positions in the government).
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criticized at home.' 396 There will be little human rights progress made unless
the country is politically restructured. Moreover, if the country breaks up under
the weight of the tons of cleavages and contradictions that weigh it down, it
will be mainly because its leadership has not taken restructuring seriously.
397
D. Complementarity of Individual and Collective Rights
In addition to all the factors specified above, human rights progress in
Nigeria requires simultaneous attention to both individual and collective
rights. What this means is that proper or adequate attention to human rights
in the country is not limited to just maintaining a balance between political-
civil rights and socioeconomic rights as analyzed in Part V.B. above; it also,
of necessity, is something that incorporates attention to the balance between
individual and group rights. However, neither the Obasanjo government
nor Westerners who assess the progress of human rights in Nigeria and
Africa seem to fully appreciate the need for this complementarity of
individual and collective rights. General Obasanjo has not paid adequate
attention to the Niger Delta problem and he has excluded Igbos in his
administration. Human rights NGOs who have assessed the Obasanjo
government's human rights records have paid little attention to the violation
of the rights of Igbos in Nigeria since the end of the civil war in 1970 that
has continued unabated under General Obasanjo. These groups have talked
about the violation of the human rights of the Ogonis and other groups in
the Niger Delta, which is all right yet incomplete since it does not include
the situation of the Igbos, a major ethnic group comprising one-quarter of
the country's population. In short, a factor accounting for the paradox
between civil rule and human rights violations that exists in the country
under General Obasanjo arises from a lack of due recognition of the
relationship between individual and group rights and therefore necessity for
simultaneous attention to both two categories of rights.
One way to bridge the gap between individual and collective rights will
be for the Nigerian constitution to recognize and protect solidarity rights
along with socioeconomic rights as the ACHPR already does. Group
rights need attention in Nigeria and Africa because, as Professor Rhoda
Howard noted and the experience of the Igbos and the Ogonis and other
396. Lawmakers Say President Ordered Killings, supra note 292, at 6.
397. See Bolaji Akinyemi, Nigeria: A Mere Geographical Expression?, GUARDIAN
(LAGOS), July 6, 2001, at 8-9; Peter Ekeh, Breakdown in Nigeria's National Consensus,
GUARDIAN (LAGOS), July 2, 2001, at 63. Both articles argue that the country must adopt
genuine federalism if it is to avert disintegration.
marginalized ethnic groups in the Niger Delta bear out, abusive state
policies put groups at risk in Africa.398 Collective or group rights are real
rights that, along with individual rights, require protection in national
constitutions. Proper attention to human rights in Nigeria in particular and
the African continent as a whole requires that the two rights go together.
Recognizing these rights may force governments to pay more attention to
economic development for individuals and groups alike and accept it as an
important yardstick for assessing their performance. No strategy for
human rights promotion in Nigeria will succeed that does not pay strong
attention to group rights. The country will not make headway in human
rights promotion if attention is not paid to group rights. Group rights have
always been critical in Nigeria. A major factor lending impetus to
guarantee of "fundamental rights" in the country's Constitution was
concern about "minority" (group) rights.3 99
One reason for attention to group rights in Nigeria and other African
countries is that problem in this area spill over and complicate achievements
in other rights categories. For example, problems in solidarity rights can
affect socioeconomic development (less peace to generate prosperity).
There is a need for continual restructuring of the political system, discussed
already above, to eliminate oppression and give every group within the
country ownership and a sense of belonging in the political system. There
will still be problems in a materially prosperous country if certain sections
of the country feel that they do not receive their fair share of the national
wealth. Promoting increased access to state power for all groups is a human
rights issue in Nigeria. Accomplishing this purpose can also minimize
opportunities for conflict that could result in human rights violations. Even
military regimes try to correct these problems, much more so civilian
governments. The importance of ethnicity in African politics400 guarantees
that the influence of group identities in Nigeria and other African societies
will remain strong for a long time to come.
VI. CONCLUSION
The expectation of improvement anticipated from civilian rule has not
materialized and violations of human rights have continued to occur in
Nigeria even under a civilian regime. General Obasanjo's record since
1999 belies the hope of Nigerians that a non-military regime will be
more human rights-protective. Explanation for the paradox occasioned
by the coexistence of civ'il rule and human rights violations in Nigeria
398. Howard, supra note 35, at 168.
399. Willink Commission Report, supra note 41.
400. See NAOMI CHAZAN ET AL., POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA
108-18 (3d ed. 1999).
[VOL. 4: 209, 2003] Nigeria Since May 1999
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.
since 1999 is that progress in human rights requires: 1) a democracy
imbued with rights (or liberal democracy) that Nigeria does not have;
2) a certain measure of economic prosperity, which has yet to take place
in the over three years General Obasanjo has been in office; 3) fundamental
restructuring of the political system, which is yet to occur in the
country; and, 4) due recognition, not present yet, of the relationship or
complementarity of individual and group rights.
It is tempting to conclude that Nigerians set themselves up for
disappointment by pitching their hopes high on one fallible civilian
government after over fifteen years of developmental devastation arising
from military rule.40 1 But nobody needs to fall into that temptation. The
real disappointment, as this Article shows, is that Obasanjo has performed
below every expectation. Nigeria is a country that, since independence,
has "moved away from ... the actualization of its vast potential, ''4°2 and
Obasanjo was elected to "prevent further destruction of the economy and
infrastructure and begin the long process of turning the country
around.' '403 Because he has not done this, the elusive search for a formula
that will harmonize ethnic competition, class conflict, social diversity, and
other cleavages4°4 into a productive synthesis goes on even as prospects
for the country's intactness as one nation, the very precondition necessary
for that search to proceed, grows bleaker everyday.
405
In addition to any explanation like that provided here, the paradox
represented by the coexistence of civil rule and human rights violations
in Nigeria since 1999 reinforces the irony of Nigeria's status as "a
perpetual underachiever. ' '406 A retired general, for all of his limitations
as a military leader, expected to perform, has performed below
expectation. A "democratic" political experiment expected to stabilize
human rights has resulted in human rights violation of a kind associated
with military rule. Yet, in spite of the disappointment for human rights
401. For example, focusing on the economy, one representative analysis advised
General Obasanjo to put together "a revolutionary economic blueprint which will inspire
speedy economic growth." It indicated that the President needs a ramification of proper
leadership that combines the patriotic nationalism of Charles de Gaulle; the untiring,
selfless application to duty of Winston Churchill; the 'economic wizardry of General
Dwight Eisenhower; and, the economic vision of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Adesanya,
supra note 136, at 64-65.
402. OSAGHAE, supra note 66, at 13-14.
403. Mundt & Aborisade, supra note 76, at 728.
404. GRAF, supra note 67, at 13.
405. See discussion supra Parts IV.B.1.-4.
406. Williams, supra note 122, at 408.
the Obasanjo government signifies, the country needs to keep
authoritarian rule at bay and stay the course of civil-democratic rule.
"Democracy is the worst possible form of government except for all
others.' 40 7 "There is no better way of developing the values, skills, and
commitments of democratic citizenship," including respect for human
rights, "than through direct experience with democracy, no matter how
imperfect it may be. 4 °8 Because it forms the basis for any meaningful
discussion of progress in human rights, democracy, even a low human-
rights protective one, is better than military rule.
407. Winston S. Churchill (1874-1965), British politician and two-time prime minister.
408. See DIAMOND, supra note 13, at 3. ,
